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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN AMERICAN AND GERMAN LAW-
TENDENCIES TOWARDS APPROXIMATION OF
APPARENTLY IRRECONCILABLE CONCEPTS
VOLKER BEHR*
THE APPARENTLY UNBRIDGEABLE GAP BETWEEN AMERICAN AND
GERMAN APPROACHES TOWARDS PUNITIVE DAMAGES
For more than a century an apparently irreconcilable gap has
separated the American and German concepts of the law of damages.
In the vast majority of states in the United States of America, the
concept of the law of damages is dualistic: damages can be recovered
for the losses incurred, including loss of profit, and for punishment of
the wrongdoer. This concept allows a plaintiff to recover punitive
(exemplary) damages in addition to compensatory damages if the
defendant has damaged the plaintiff "intentionally," "maliciously,"
"consciously," "recklessly," "willfully," "wantonly," or "oppres-
sively".1 The idea of a dual function for damages is well-established
* Professor of Law, University of Augsburg, Germany. The author gratefully acknowl-
edges the invaluable assistance he received from the editorial board of the law review. He
especially thanks Allison Kirk, who, without hesitation, assumed the difficult tasks of checking
citations, adapted them to the American system of citations, and helped to make legible the text
of a nonnative speaker.
1. Courts in general address "reckless, willful, and wanton misconduct" of the defendant.
See Klaus Beucher & John B. Sandage, United States Punitive Damage Awards in German
Courts: The Evolving German Position on Service and Enforcement, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 967, 971 (1991).
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and time-honored, 2 with punitive damages currently available in most
of the fifty sister states.3
On the other hand, under the German Civil Code of 1900,4 the
law of damages is purely monistic, if taken at face value. Damages
are strictly restricted to compensation. General statutory regulations
on damages in sections 249 through 255 of the German Civil Code
only address restitution and compensation. These regulations,
however, are silent in regards to punitive damages. Nevertheless, and
mostly for dogmatic and historical reasons, for about a century the
nearly unanimous understanding of sections 249 through 255 of the
German Civil Code can be summed up in the following way: the
exclusive legitimate function of damages is compensation of the
victim. Consequently, punishment of the tortfeasor is not a legitimate
function of damages. German civil law and criminal law are separate.
Punitive damages are punishment, and, while a wrongdoer may be
punished exclusively under the concept of criminal law, by no means
is such punishment allowed under the concept of civil law. In the
course of time, the very idea of punitive damages has become so
unfamiliar to German law that blackletter doctrine on damages
scarcely gives the notion of punitive damages, or its German equiva-
lent Strafschadensersatz. Instead, punitive damages live in the
shadows. They are only incidentally mentioned under the rubric of
the general purposes of damages. When discussing functions of
damages, German doctrine generally starts by stating that damages
have the exclusive function of giving compensation for losses. Puni-
tive functions are then addressed negatively, by adding that the
tortfeasor shall not be punished by means of an obligation to pay
2. See Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991), stating that "[p]unitive damages have long been a part of traditional state
tort law." The opinion cites American and English court decisions and relies on Blackstone. As
to the historic development, see David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability
Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1262-64 nn.17-23 (1976). See also Stephen Daniels &
Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1990); David G.
Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363,
368-70 (1994) [hereinafter Damages Overview]; Anthony J. Sebok, Legal Culture and the Desire
for Retribution: Punishment in German and American Private Law (2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review); Note, An Economic Analysis of the
Plaintiffs Windfall from Punitive Damage Litigation, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1900 (1992).
3. See RICHARD BLATT ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES, ch. 8 (1991 & Supp. 1999).
4. The German Civil Code, Buergerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB], was enacted in 1896 but set
in force on January 1, 1900. Its second book, Law of Obligations, was significantly modernized
in 2001 and set in force on January 1, 2002. But sections on damages have remained un-
changed-except for a significant alteration of section 253 allowing damages for pain and
suffering in additional cases, BGBI. 2002 I, 2674.
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damages.5 One of the leading textbooks on the law of obligations
states that damages, being an economic and social problem of alloca-
tion, have developed in a way that prohibits further reliance on their
former common root of punishment; ignoring this development
would lead to a reintroduction of punitive elements into the law of
damages, which would be contrary to its history and development as a
purely compensatory function.6 The more exhaustive discussions of
punitive damages are only found under the heading of enforcement of
foreign judgments, notably American punitive damages awards. The
general attitude of these discussions, again, is negative. In a much
discussed decision on the enforcement of an American punitive
damages award, the German Federal Supreme Court stated that7
sanctions serving the purposes of punishment and deterioration serve
to protect the general legal order, which, according to German
understanding, fall under the state's monopoly on punishments that is
garnished by special procedural guarantees.'
What seems to be but a theoretical distinction turns out to be of
practical relevance when an American money judgment creditor
applies for enforcement of his judgment in Germany. Enforcement
of foreign judgments under German law,9 like under American law, 10
will not be granted if the foreign judgment is contrary to domestic
public policy. German courts and legal literature emphasize that
5. For the leading commentaries on the German Civil Code, see WOLFGANG GRUNSKY,
MUENCHENER KOMMENTAR BUERGERLICHES GESETZBUCH, § 249 n.3 (3d ed. 1994) (citing
JOSEF ESSER & EIKE SCHMIDT, SCHULDERECHT, ALLGEMEINER TElL § 30 11 (7th ed. 1993);
KARL LARENZ, LEHRBUCH DES SCHULDERECHTS, ALLGEMEINER TElL § 27 I (13th ed.
1982)).
6. ESSER & SCHMIDT, supra note 5, at § 30 II.
7. BGHZ 118, 312; see also Germany: Federal Court of Justice Decision Concerning the
Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. Judgments Awarding Punitive Damages, 32 I.L.M. 1320
(1993) [hereinafter Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. Judgments]; Peter Hay, The Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of American Money-Judgments in Germany - The 1992 Decision of the
German Supreme Court, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 729 (1992).
8. BGHZ 118, 312; Recognition and Enforcement of U.S. Judgments, supra note 7, at
1339-40.
9. Under section 723, subsection 2 of the German Code of Civil Procedure, enforcement
of a foreign judgment is denied in cases where recognition of the judgment is not available
under section 328. Section 328 of the German Code of Civil Procedure states that recognition
of a foreign judgment is excluded when recognition leads to a result manifestly irreconcilable
with fundamental principles of German law. For a more complete discussion of enforcement
requirements under German law, see Volker Behr, Enforcement of United States Money
Judgments in Germany, 13 J.L. & COM. 211 (1994); Dieter Martiny, Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Money Judgments in the Federal Republic of Germany, 35 AM. J. CoMP. L. 721
(1987).
10. This has been the case since Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U. S. 113 (1895). See also UNIFORM
FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4.
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punitive damages are not only unknown to German law, but are
contrary to German public policy." Thus, to this day, American
punitive damage awards are not enforced in Germany.
This Article will examine whether the apparently unbridgeable
gap between the U.S. concept of punitive damages and the German1 2
concept of restricting damages to reparation and compensation is as
fundamental as it is said to be, or whether it has been bridged or
narrowed to a degree such that the two systems are reconcilable with
one another. Such reconciliation would put German courts in a
position to eventually enforce U.S. punitive damage awards. In order
to better understand what can be considered a changing attitude
towards punitive damages, Part I distinguishes compensatory dam-
ages from punitive damages that are concealed under presumably
nonpunitive concepts by looking beyond the standardized formula of
compensation versus punishment and deterrence.
Approximation of the two apparently incoherent systems may be
achieved from either side. Developments may be traced in punitive
damages systems that are not strictly punitive, which releases the
principle from its perceived rigidity. Likewise, over the course of
time, important punitive elements might be introduced into a purely
compensatory damages system without being acknowledged or fully
realized. Using this approach we will discern whether within the U.S.
system of punitive damages there are naturally inherent or recently
developed nonpunitive elements that would eventually narrow the
gap between the American and German laws of damages. Con-
versely, we must scrutinize the German system for noncompensatory,
punitive elements.
Part II discusses the actual position of punitive damages in the
United States. U.S. punitive damages law developments have been
analyzed in numerous scholarly writings from an isolated American
perspective. This Article does not give a full review of the history,
theory, and practice of U.S. punitive damages law. Instead, in search-
ing for tendencies towards approximation, it focuses on developments
11. BGHZ 118, 312 (343). German legal literature in general agrees. See HAIMO SCHACK,
INTERNATIONALES ZIVILVERFAHRENSRECHT n.869 (3d ed. 2002).
12. Similar restrictions of damages to compensation can be found in Japanese and Swiss
law. They lead to the same problems in enforcement of U.S. punitive damages awards. For a
discussion of recent Japanese and Swiss courts' decisions, see Ronald A. Brand, Punitive
Damages and the Recognition of Judgments, NETH. INT. L. REV. [N.I.L.R.], 1996, at 167-71.
Besides the question of whether punitive damages are unenforceable on the ground that they
are criminal judgments and, consequently unenforceable, the discussion of punitive damages as
a public policy violation is similar to the German discussion.
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from the fundamentally different German perspective, which strictly
restricts damages to compensation. Those differences relate to the
very concept of punitive damages and focus on ideas of punishment,
deterrence, and law enforcement, which, in turn, relate to the enor-
mous sums awarded as punitive damages. This Article highlights
recent developments aimed at restricting punitive damages and
assesses whether these developments indicate a turnaround situation
in punitive damage theory. Additionally, Part II focuses on develop-
ments where nonpunitive aims are pursued under the guise of puni-
tive damages.
Part III outlines the traditional, purely compensatory, German
approach, and then examines modern developments in punitive
damage law which do not fit into that traditional approach. These
developments indicate a tendency towards implantation of punitive
elements into the German legal system. Part IV attempts to measure
the gap between the U.S and German systems. Currently, enforce-
ment of U.S. punitive damage awards is contrary to German public
policy requirements. Part V investigates the question of whether or
to what extent this requirement is likely to be applied in future
enforcement cases.
I. COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES-EASILY
DISTINGUISHED BUT NOT ALWAYS EASILY IDENTIFIED
Punitive damages are fundamentally different from compensa-
tory damages. Although stemming from a common root, punitive and
compensatory damages have developed in different directions,
distinguished mainly by the purposes they pursue.13 Hence, in theory,
compensatory and punitive damages should easily be distinguished
from one another based on their respective purposes. According to
American and German understandings, compensatory damages
exclusively aim at compensation of victims' losses, including lost
profits. They are awarded in order to compensate for damages the
plaintiff has suffered or is expected to suffer and to replace something
the plaintiff has lost or is expected to lose because of the wrongful act.
Their one and only purpose is to restore those losses. By awarding
compensatory damages, the court shall put the victim in the position
he or she would have been in had the defendant not committed the
13. See Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001).
2003]
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wrongful act. 14 Punitive damages, on the other hand, are aimed at
punishment, deterrence, and law enforcement. 5 They are awarded
to punish the tortfeasor for his outrageous conduct and to deter him
and others like him from similar conduct in the future. 6 So, in theory,
as long as the purposes of punitive damage awards are kept in view, a
bright line between compensatory and punitive damages should be
easily and readily drawn based on their respective compensatory or
punitive purposes.
But what seems simple in theory may turn out difficult in practice
as soon as a legal system pretends not to apply punitive damages, and
consequently, courts in such a legal system generally will not openly
admit reliance on the punitive purposes of the damages they award.
Under such circumstances, it may be difficult to identify whether
damages are awarded for purely compensatory purposes or for
punitive purposes as well. Under these circumstances, a purpose-
oriented approach may fail. Instead, one must search not just for
plain punitive purposes argumentation, but also for punitive elements
veiled under apparently compensatory constructions. The legal
analyst is forced to pierce the compensatory veil. To achieve this goal
it is necessary to develop more refined criteria on which to distinguish
between the two, and then rely on these indicia related to compensa-
tory or punitive damages respectively.
A first indicator of punitive elements in damages may be derived
from the objective. Depending on the different purposes of compen-
satory and punitive damages, the amount of damages awarded is
measured in different ways. Because compensatory damages replace
the losses of the victim, the amount of those damages is measured and
strictly limited by those losses. Compensatory damages must be
equal to the loss suffered by the individual victim. 7 On the other
hand, a punitive damages award is not determined exclusively, or
14. As to the United States, see id. (distinguishing punitive damages from compensatory
damages). See also Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 54 (1991) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1979). As to Germany,
see BGHZ 118, 312, (343).
15. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 423; BGHZ 118, 312 (distinguishing U.S. punitive damages from
German compensatory damages).
16. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 432; see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908
(1979).
17. See SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 253, at 242-43 (2d
ed. 1972) ("[damages] should be precisely commensurate with the injury."); see also Cooper, 532
U.S. at 432 ("[compensatory damages] are intended to redress the concrete loss that the plaintiff
has suffered").
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even primarily, by the losses the plaintiff suffered. Instead, the award
is determined by the seriousness of the wrong, the seriousness of the
plaintiff's injury, the extent of the defendant's wealth, the profit the
defendant made from his wrongful act, the necessity to deter the
defendant and others like him from similar wrongful conduct, and the
necessity to improve law enforcement. 8 In short, compensatory
damages are strictly loss-oriented while punitive damages are wrong-
oriented. Consequently, damages awards that give the victim more
than he lost or is expected to lose and that take into consideration the
seriousness of the wrongful act are likely not purely compensatory
but instead influenced by punitive purposes.
Compensatory damages focus on the individual victim. In adju-
dicating compensatory damages, neither the tortfeasor, third persons,
nor society play a decisive role. The defendant/tortfeasor is only
viewed from the perspective of determining from whom to recover
damages. Generally, the person of the tortfeasor is not taken into
consideration. Whether he acted negligently, intentionally, or reck-
lessly, or whether he is liable without fault, has no significance.
Whether he profited from his wrongful act is unimportant. Questions
of whether and how much he will suffer from the obligation to pay
damages or whether or not he will change his behavior are irrelevant.
For the most part, compensatory damages do not differ in amount
when awarded for willful and wanton wrongful acts, negligent acts, or
even nonfault acts. 9
On the other hand, punitive damages focus primarily, if not ex-
clusively, on the tortfeasor and his wrongful act. Additional focus is
given to third persons and society, but scarcely is any focus given to
the victim. The individual victim and his losses give rise to an award
of punitive damages, but they are not the cause or reason of punitive
damages. Instead, punitive damages focus on the tortfeasor and his
intent, recklessness, or similar attitude that not only determine
whether punitive damages are awarded, but also influence the
18. See Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 499 U.S. at 16 (stating that punitive damages have in mind
the enormity of the offence rather than the measure of compensation to the plaintiff); see also
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) (stating that punitive damages should
reflect "the enormity of the offense" and the degree of fault). As to the "contemporary
functions" of punitive damages, see generally Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical
Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REV.
1269, 1309-26 (1993).
19. See MOTIVE ZU DEM ENTWURFE EINES BUERGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHES FUER DAS
DEUTSCHE REICH § 218, at 799 (BGB 1896) [hereinafter MOTIVE]. This draft of the German
Civil Code rejects measuring damages according to the degree of fault.
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amount of those damages. Punitive damages reflect the enormity of
the offense of the tortfeasor. 20 In awarding punitive damages, courts
consider the economic situation of the tortfeasor,21 and whether and
to what extent the tortfeasor profited from his wrongful act. Punitive
damages are awarded to deter the tortfeasor from committing similar
acts in future. They take into consideration other victims who suf-
fered from the tortfeasor's similar behavior and are awarded to
prevent persons like the tortfeasor from similar behavior. The
suffering of the named plaintiff is of relatively little importance. The
victim and his losses are incidental to punitive damages.2
Focusing on the victim in compensatory damages does not mean
that the tortfeasor has no significance. The wrongful act and the
wrongdoer are necessary prerequisites for a claim. However, these
prerequisites are generally not evaluated in the adjudication of
damages. On the other hand, the highlighting of tortfeasors and
society in punitive damages does not mean that the victim has no
significance. Similar to compensatory damages, the victim and his
suffering of damages may be necessary prerequisites for a punitive
award. But, again, they generally are not further evaluated unless
included in the analysis of the seriousness of the offense.23 In short,
compensatory damages are primarily victim-oriented, while punitive
damages are primarily tortfeasor and society-oriented. 24
Under special circumstances, focusing on the relevant person
may be misleading. Thus, a proviso is necessary. When determining
damage amounts for pain and suffering, courts may rely on the
intention, the motivation, and even the economic situation of the
wrongdoer. In cases where damages are meant to comfort the victim
by substituting bad feelings with good feelings, the amount of dam-
ages for pain and suffering may be measured by aspects derived from
the person of the wrongdoer. A good example of this concept is
where reaction to infringement with the right to personality is at
stake. The German concept of satisfaction (Genugtuung)25 is based
20. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575 (relying on 150 years of court practice).
21. See the jury instruction cited in Cooper, 532 U.S. at 439 n.12.
22. Id. The jury instruction does not mention the victim at all. Recent court decisions on
punitive damages consider the victim and his losses at least as far as the proportionality test is
concerned. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 575.
23. The wrongful act in itself may lead to criminal punishment even without any damages
occurring. If it is taken as a basis of a claim for damages, damages must have occurred.
24. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 432 (comparing compensatory damages with punitive damages).
25. For a lengthy discussion of this concept, see Sebok, supra note 2.
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on this idea. The tortfeasor has to pay the amount of damages
necessary to comfort the victim and to put the victim in a position
where the bad feelings are substituted with good feelings. Thus, in
cases of damages for pain and suffering, the real focus seems to be the
victim and the victim's need for comfort. Considering the person of
the wrongdoer is a means of adequately compensating the victim.
Consequently, German courts, in cases of violation of the right to
personality, occasionally consider the person of the tortfeasor (i.e., his
economic situation,2 6 or his intentional or negligent acts) when
calculating the amount of damages. 27 In order to comply with their
pretend, pure compensatory system of damages, courts try to turn
tortfeasor-oriented considerations into a victim-oriented approach.
Courts argue that taking such facts into account is necessary to
adequately compensate the victim, thus focusing on the victim instead
of the tortfeasor. From this perspective, satisfaction becomes a
transmission belt to turn tortfeasor-oriented considerations into
victim-oriented considerations and makes compensatory what seems
to be punitive.
Although somewhat intertwined with the person looked at, a fi-
nal and separate distinction is the different perspectives regarding the
relevant time period to be examined. Compensatory damages
consider the wrong, the damages, and the persons involved more or
less retrospectively. The only prospective element, which focuses on
the person of the victim, is the future damages of the wrongful act
that may be compensated in advance. As opposed to compensatory
damages, punitive damages are mostly prospective because they are
aimed at deterring the tortfeasor and persons like him from future
wrongful acts and misbehavior. They are retrospective only insofar as
the retaliatory function of punishment is retrospective.
In sum, compensatory damages serve to put the victim in the po-
sition where he would have been in had the wrongful act not oc-
curred. They are loss-oriented, victim-oriented, and retrospective.
On the other hand, punitive damages serve to punish and deter the
tortfeasor. They are action-oriented, tortfeasor-oriented, and mostly
prospective.
26. BGHZ 18, 149 (159).
27. Id. at 157; BGHZ 128, 117 (120); Federal Supreme Court, 1993 Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift [NJW] 23, 1531 (1531).
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II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RECONSIDERED
A. Development of a Dual System Within the American Law of
Damages
At least since the nineteenth century, 28 the conceptual idea of the
law of damages in the United States has been based on two distinct
and mostly separate pillars: the compensation of the victim and the
punishment and deterrence of the tortfeasor and others like him. The
famous nineteenth-century debate29 regarding whether the law of
damages should be purely compensatory or may also encompass
punitive aspects seems to have been decided in favor of a dualistic
system. The famous, often cited statement of Simon Greenleaf that
"damages are given as a compensation, recompense, or satisfaction to
the plaintiff, for an injury actually received by the defendant. They
should be precisely commensurate with the injury; neither more nor
less .... "30 may reflect the positions of German legislation in 1900 and
even modern German blackletter doctrine.3 But this statement does
not reflect the reality of the last 150 years of the law of damages in the
United States. Instead, the United States' position since the "war on
punitive damages ' 32 can best be described by the statement of Theo-
dore Sedgwick that
the law permits the jury to give what it terms punitory, vindictive,
or exemplary damages; in other words, blends together the interest
of society and of the aggrieved individual, and gives damages not
only to recompense the sufferer, but to punish the offender. This
rule seems settled in England, and in the general jurisprudence of
this country. 33
This statement still perfectly describes the American law of damages
in practice.34 Over time, the punitive damages pillar of this dualistic
system has, in many ways, been broadened to situations far beyond
28. As to the pre-nineteenth-century development, see Rustad & Koenig, supra note 18, at
1284-1334.
29. As to the nineteenth century "War on Punitive Damages," see id. at 1298-1304.
30. GREENLEAF, supra note 17, § 253, at 242-43 (emphasis added).
31. See infra Part III.
32. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 18, at 1298.
33. THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES 38-39 (1972)
(emphasis added).
34. See Damages Overview, supra note 2, at 370 n.31 (mentioning Nebraska as the only
state to prohibit punitive damages on constitutional grounds).
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the traditional reach of punitive damages. 35 These damages have, in a
sense, become even more punitive in that in some states part of the
punitive damage award no longer goes to the victim, but instead to
the state or assigned organizations. At the same time, the amounts of
damages awarded have skyrocketed.36
B. The Impact of Modern Restrictions on Punitive Damages
Looked at through the eyes of a foreign lawyer, the actual atti-
tude towards punitive damages within the United States can be
summed up by stating that the common law concept of punitive
damages is undergoing: (1) a development on the technical side from
common law practice towards additional and detailed statutory
regulation; (2) a development in substance, albeit still vacillating,
from out-of-control amounts of punitive damages towards restrictions
as to the permissible amount of punitive damages; and (3) a develop-
ment in substance towards granting part of the damage award to the
state, persons, or institutions other than the plaintiff.37 Do these
developments change the conceptual idea of punitive damages and
help to bridge the gap between the American and German systems of
damages? While the technical shift towards statutory regulations
evidently does not change the conceptual idea of punitive damages,
the alterations in substance must be considered in detail.
Significant statutory law reform and the introduction of judicial
limitations on punitive damages38 have changed the landscape of the
law of damages. Although modern punitive damages vary tremen-
dously from state to state, in recent years there has been a trend in
most states toward limiting punitive damages awards. Significant
limitations on punitive damages have been introduced by individual
state legislation, 39 federal legislation, 40 and U.S. Supreme Court
35. See Sebok, supra note 2.
36. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). As to the skyrocketing amounts of punitive damages in the tobacco
crusade, see Engle v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco, No. 94-8273 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 6, 2000) (awarding
nearly $145 billion in punitive damages-although in a class action).
37. For an overview on modem legislation restricting punitive damages, see BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 614 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
38. See Brand, supra note 12, at 159-63.
39. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 614; Brand, supra note 12, at 176-86. For a recent update, see
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433 n.6 (2001).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(b)(3) (1994).
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jurisprudence. 1 Even the general philosophy regarding punitive
damages seems to be no longer unquestioned. 42 The number of states
that restrict punitive damages either by legislation or by court deci-
sions is growing. 43 Although most recent state statutory regulations
adhere to the general dualistic concept and have not abolished
punitive damages, many states have introduced general ceilings on
punitive damages or have capped the amount of allowable damages. 44
1. Permissible Amounts of Punitive Damages under Review
According to traditional notions, whether to award punitive
damages and the amount to be awarded is within the discretion of the
courts. 45 While historically punitive damage awards had been rare
and the amounts awarded rather restricted, during the last few
decades the punitive award amounts have risen dramatically. 46 There
have been numerous cases in which double and triple-digit million,
and even triple-digit billion dollar punitive damages have been
awarded; 47 although it should be noted that such large and arguably
41. The key case is BMW, in which the Supreme Court declared a $2 million punitive
damages award unconstitutional as a violation of the Due Process Clause. The original $4
million punitive damages award from the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, had
already been reduced to $2 million by the Supreme Court of Alabama. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 646 So. 2d 619 (Ala. 1994).
42. For concerns on constitutionality, see Justice Blackmun's majority opinion in Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 9 (1990). For a discussion of this controversy,
see Rustad & Koenig, supra note 18, at 1298-1304 (referring to the nineteenth-century "War on
Punitive Damages," which is now reduced to a war on permissible amounts of punitive
damages).
43. See BMW, 517 U.S. 559 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). For recent additional legislation, see
Cooper, 532 U.S. at 433 n.6. See generally Brand, supra note 12, at 162; Pamela Coyle, When
Bigger Isn't Better, A.B.A. J., March 1995, at 66; Note, On Efficiency, Punishment, Deterrence
and Fairness: A Survey of Punitive Damages Law and a Proposed Jury Instruction, 27 SUFFOLK
U. L. REV. 825 (1993).
44. See, e.g., NEB. CONST. art. VII, § 5 (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-220(2) (1995);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-1-4 (Michie 1987); Int'l
Harvester Credit Corp. v. Seale, 518 So. 2d 1039 (La. 1988); USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener
Corp., 467 N.E.2d 1271 (Mass. 1984); Hayes-Albion v. Kuberski, 364 N.W.2d 609 (Mich. 1984);
Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank of Tampa, Fla., 635 P.2d 441 (1981).
45. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. d (1979). This general attitude has not
been erased by Supreme Court decisions like BMW, 517 U.S at 568, and Cooper, 532 U.S. at
432. Instead, these decisions only make a review for abuse of discretion available under the
Fourteenth Amendment when an award can fairly be categorized as grossly excessive.
46. See Haslip, 499 U.S. at 61-64 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (calling for a reassessment of
the constitutionality of the time-honored practice).
47. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) ($125
million award reduced to $3.5 million); Moseley v. Gen. Motors Corp., 447 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1994); see also Andrew L. Sparks, Comment, The Current State of Punitive Damages in
Environmental Litigation: An Examination of North American BMW v. Gore, J. NAT.
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excessive punitive awards have been the exception, and have often
been reduced either by the parties' negotiations or by higher courts'
decisions. 48 Meanwhile, amidst criticism that caps on punitive dam-
ages might undermine their deterrent effect, 49 a significant number of
states have put caps on punitive damages by statutory regulations or
court decisions.50 And the Supreme Court in BMW of North America
v. Gore51 called for a cap on punitive damages based on constitutional
grounds.
Thus, the most important development in the field of punitive
damages seems to be the changing attitude towards the amount of
damages awarded. By attaching the permissible amount of punitive
damages to actual compensatory damages, such damages obviously
are not transformed into compensatory damages. But at least the
effect becomes somehow more compensation-related. And a reduc-
tion in the amount of punitive damage awards could be a means to
narrow the gap between the German and American systems.
2. Legislative Restrictions by Caps on Punitive Damages
During the last decade there has been a significant amount of
federal and state legislation restricting the available amounts of
punitive damages by putting a ceiling on available damage amounts.
Statutes in about twenty states by now either generally,52 or with
regards to special types of cases,5 3 have fixed maximum amounts54 or
by limiting punitive damages to compensatory damages or restricting
them to simple55 double5 6 triple 5 7 or quadruple 8 the amount of
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L., 1998-99, at 299 (citing Verdicts and Settlements: $217 million
Awarded Against Rockwell for PCB Runoff, NAT'L L.J., July 29, 1996, at A15).
48. See Brand, supra note 12, at 155-58.
49. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 18, at 1277.
50. For an overview, see BMW, 517 U.S. at 614 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). As to additional
states having added caps on punitive damages, see Cooper, 532 U.S. at 433 n.6.
51. See Cooper, 532 U.S. 424; BMW, 517 U.S. at 559.
52. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(1)(a), (3) (1998).
53. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-240b (1995) (punitive damages in product liability cases).
54. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(g) (2000) (placing a ceiling of $250,000 in some tort
actions).
55. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(1)(a), (3).
56. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-240b.
57. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1)(a)-(b) (West 2002).
58. E.g., S. 187,409th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1995).
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compensatory damages.59 Eventually, statutes will combine these
types of restrictions or put other ceilings on punitive damages. For
example, one important federal act that has a kind of European
counterpart puts a $300,000 cap on punitive damages in cases of
intentional discrimination in employment (depending on the number
of workforce occupied).6°
On the other hand, it should be noted that even under legislation
that has generally put a ceiling on punitive damages, such ceilings do
not necessarily apply to all situations. Instead, in exceptional situa-
tions, unlimited punitive damages are still available. 61
3. Reduction of Punitive Damages Awarded in Jury Verdicts
Moreover, jurisprudence is tending to accept that there are limi-
tations on punitive damages even where not fixed by statute. You can
find these developments in state courts as well as in the federal
courts. Actual discussion is fueled by BMW of North America Inc. v.
Gore,62 where the Supreme Court of the United States in a highly
controversial decision-four judges dissenting on two different sets of
grounds-reversed the judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court,63
which already had reduced the $4 million punitive damages award of
the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, remanding the case
for further proceedings not inconsistent with the Court's opinion.
But the BMW case only highlights a development which had started
earlier and which was affirmed in more recent decisions.64
4. Restrictions on the Amount of Punitive Damages in State Courts
It should be kept in mind that state courts have been restricting
the amount of punitive damages for some time. First, state courts
more than occasionally reduce punitive damages by means of remitti-
tur.65 Where a jury verdict assesses damages that the court deems
59. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 614 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
As to additional states having added caps on punitive damages since then, see Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433 n.6.
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). For the European counterpart, see infra note 180 and
accompanying text.
61. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 400.0238 (West 2002).
62. BMW, 517 U.S. at 563.
63. 646 So. 2d 619 (Ala. 1994).
64. See Cooper, 532 U.S. at 424.
65. For a definition of remittitur, see BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1298 (7th ed. 1999). A
remittitur occurs when a jury verdict seems excessive to a court, and the judge requests a party
to accept judgment for a smaller amount as a condition for denying the other party's motion for
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excessive or are beyond the state's legislative cap, the court may
reduce the amount of damages. There have been challenges to the
right of the court to reduce a punitive damages verdict, but, in many
cases, such reductions have been upheld. 66 On the other hand, where
statutory regulations restrict punitive damages by putting caps on
them, courts see no need to impose additional limits on punitive
damages.67
5. Restrictions of Punitive Damages in Federal Courts
For more than a decade, the Supreme Court has expressed
concern about excessive punitive damages awards. In Aetna Life
Insurance Co. v. Lavoie,61 the Court stated that in an appropriate
setting the constitutionality of excessive punitive damages must be
resolved.69 The Court went a step further in TXO Production Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp.,0 stating that "when an award can fairly be
categorized as 'grossly excessive' in relation to these interests does it
enter the zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment."'" Finally, in BMW, 2 the Court had the
opportunity to decide this constitutional question. Reversing a
judgment from the Supreme Court of Alabama, the Court held that
''grossly excessive" punitive damages "transcend the constitutional
limit" established by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment 73 and set up the guideposts regarding the degree of
requisite responsibility, the proper ratio of punitive to actual dam-
ages, and the comparability of punitive damages to civil and criminal
a new trial. Some courts have suggested that the permissibility of remittitur is not relevant to
the issue of damage caps because a remittitur can occur only with the plaintiff's consent, and a
damage cap takes effect without the plaintiff's consent. See Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d
463, 471 (Or. 1999). Nevertheless, no right to judgment on the verdict exists because a court
might still order a new trial without the plaintiff's consent. Theoretically, a court might order
new trials indefinitely. See STEVEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 739 (4th ed. 1996)
(commenting on theoretical possibility that a court might continuously order new trials).
66. See Matthew W. Light, Who's the Boss?: Statutory Damage Caps, Courts, and State
Constitutional Law, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 315, 321 (2001) (discussing the constitutionality of
remittitur).
67. As to federal legislation, see Notter v. North Hand Protection, No. 95-1087, 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 14954 (4th Cir. June 21, 1996). As to the construction of legislative acts done by
Congress, see Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d 1092, 1096 (8th Cir. 1995).
68. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
69. Id. at 828-29.
70. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
71. Id. at 458.
72. BMW of N. Am. Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
73. Id. at 586.
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penalties available in case of comparable misconduct.7 4 The recent
Supreme Court decision in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman
Tool Group, Inc.75 follows this reasoning.
C. The Conceptual Idea of Punitive Damages Unchanged
State legislation and court decisions may have rewritten the law
of damages,76 but the system in substance seems to remain dualistic.
Punitive damages still are confined to the goals of punishing the
defendant, deterring him and others from similar wrongdoing, and
giving an incentive to private law enforcement. According to most
commentators, the conceptual ideas of punitive damages are punish-
ment and deterrence. Punitive damages are awarded to punish the
bad guy or, more precisely, the defendant's bad behavior. At the
same time, punitive damages are awarded to deter the defendant and
others from similar misbehavior in the future.77 These aims can be
traced in recent punitive damages legislation and jurisprudence. Caps
on punitive damages do not alter these aims, and, although in certain
circumstances they may reduce the deteriorating effect, caps do not
abolish the deterrent or retaliatory purposes.
1. Actual Jurisprudence Stressing Punitive Function
In a recent Supreme Court decision, Justice Stevens, delivering
the opinion of the Court, described the purpose of punitive damages,
stating that they are "intended to punish the defendant and to deter
future wrongdoing. 7 8 As support for this statement, Justice Stevens
relied on a long line of Supreme Court decisions79 and legal litera-
ture.80 These general concepts of punishment and deterrence can best
be described by a standard jury instruction stating that
[iun determining whether or not you should award punitive dam-
ages, you should bear in mind that the purpose of such an award is
to punish the wrongdoer and to deter that wrongdoer from repeat-
74. Id. at 575-84.
75. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001).
76. See Martha Middleton, A Changing Landscape: As Congress Struggles to Rewrite the
Nation's Tort Laws, the States Already May Have Done the Job, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1995, at 56.
77. See Damages Overview, supra note 2, at 364.
78. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 432.
79. Id.
80. Id. (citing Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahnemann & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive
Damages (With Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2081 (1998));
see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111
HARV. L. REV. 869, 873-74 (1998).
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ing such wrongful acts. In addition, such damages are also designed
to serve as a warning to others, and to prevent others from commit-
ting such wrongful acts.81
Thus, punitive damages are tortfeasor-oriented, act-oriented, and
prospective. This has not changed despite the placement of caps on
punitive damages.
There are goals in addition to punishment and deterrence. These
include the desire of society to educate individuals and affirm societal
standards of conduct, and the need to provide incentives for private
law enforcement. 82 But these additional purposes in a sense are still
punishment or closely related to punishment. The same characteriza-
tion applies to the argument that punitive damages should take from
the tortfeasor the profit he derived from his wrongful act. Punitive
damages are awarded to fulfill a profit-erasing function. Wrong must
not pay. Thus, even if the plaintiff suffered no or minimal loss,83 the
wrongdoer should not profit from his wrongful act. Punitive damages
may take away any profits derived form the wrongful conduct.84
This approach is sometimes addressed in the process of calculat-
ing punitive damages. For example, in Grimshaw v. Ford Motor
Co.,85 the California Appellate Court calculated punitive damages
according to the profits that the defendant had accumulated by not
installing protective measures into its Ford Pinto cars, and then
augmented the amount in order to punish and deter Ford. Under a
purpose-oriented perspective, this approach does not focus on
compensating the individual plaintiff, but instead focuses on punish-
ing the defendant. Under a perspective that focuses on the relevant
persons, taking away from the defendant the profits that he derived
from his wrongful act primarily addresses the tortfeasor instead of the
victim. Under a perspective of whether the plaintiff's loss or the
defendant's wrongful act is decisive, it evidently is the act that counts.
In BMW, the Court evidently did not consider the potential profit
that Gore could have made and that the defendant BMW had taken
81. See Sunstein, Kahnemarn & Schkade, supra note 81, at 2081 (citing RONALD W.
EADES, JURY INSTRUCTIONS ON DAMAGES IN TORT ACrIONS 98 (3d ed. 1993)).
82. See Damages Overview, supra note 2, at 374-80.
83. This article will not discuss the problem of whether at least some kind of actual
damages is a necessary requirement for awarding punitive damages. In our context, the
outcome of this discussion would be of no significance. As to a discussion of this problem, see
Rustad & Koenig, supra note 18, at 1269.
84. See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
85. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
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away, but it was exclusively the profit BMW had derived from the
wrongful act that was taken away.86
2. Defining Goals of Punitive Damages in Statutory Regulation
New statutory regulations restricting punitive damages clearly
rely on punishment and deterrence.87 These statutes sometimes only
name one of the several above-mentioned aspects as its goal, but the
goal(s) that are named still serve punitive purposes. They still are
wrongdoer-oriented, act-oriented, and prospective, and thus punitive.
A cap on punitive damages does not alter these goals. Moreover,
modern statutory regulations sometimes make punitive damages even
more punitive than they used to be. The most significant evidence of
the quasi-criminal character of punitive damages in recent statutory
regulations can be found in modern legislation allocating part of the
damages award not to the plaintiff himself but to the state treasurys8
or to charitable trusts.89 As a matter of principle, compensation has to
go to the victim in order to fulfill its function.
D. Additional Compensatory Functions of Punitive Damages
While punitive damages in a strict sense always were and still
remain act-oriented, tortfeasor-oriented, and prospectively aimed at
punishment of the wrongdoer and specific and general deterrence,
from a practical perspective, punitive damages also contain victim-
oriented and retrospective ideas. Punitive damages have been used at
least in part for compensatory purposes. This additional, compensa-
tory function of punitive damages does not bridge the gap between a
monistic, compensatory system of damages and a dualistic system.
But it could narrow the gap to a degree such that a monistic system at
least in part could accept punitive damages awards.
First, punitive damages are used to evade the general American
rule of adjudicating costs. While under German law of civil proce-
dure the prevailing party receives restitution of his attorneys' fees, in
86. The trial court had calculated the punitive damages based on the total number of
refinished cars that had been sold as new, providing BMW with a profit of $4,000 per vehicle.
See BMW of N. Am. Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 564 (1996).
87. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000). As to the law enforcement argument, see H.R. REP.
NO. 102-40(I), at 49 (1991).
88. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e) (1994).
For a survey on the different beneficiaries, see BMW, 517 U.S. at 614 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
89. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(a)-(b) (West 2002); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675
(1994).
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the United States each party must pay its own attorneys' fees. 90 Thus,
winning the case does not automatically include being compensated
for your own attorneys' fees.91 From this perspective, "compensa-
tion" could be considered to be less than full compensation. 92 Hence,
without appropriate legislation, there may be no legal basis for the
recovery of attorneys' fees. In such circumstances, courts may excuse
the successful plaintiff from his attorneys' fees by awarding or aug-
menting punitive damages, taking into consideration that the plaintiff
will not be able to keep the full amount of damages awarded because
he must pay his attorneys' fees. 93
Traditional notions of punishment and deterrence could explain
awarding punitive damages to help the plaintiff pay attorneys' fees,
putting an even higher burden on the tortfeasor. But at the same
time, deviating from the American rule of costs and exonerating the
plaintiff from the economic harm the tortfeasor has caused can be
considered compensatory. If the purpose of damages is examined,
awarding compensatory damages serves the goal of redressing the
loss the plaintiff has suffered. Paying attorneys' fees with regular
compensatory damages would lead to the result that in the end the
plaintiff would not be in the economic position he would have been
had the tortfeasor not committed the damaging act. By examining
whom to look at when exonerating the plaintiff from his attorneys'
fees, the focus is not on the defendant and his wrongful act and future
behavior, but instead on the victim and his losses.
90. Section 91 of the German Code of Civil Procedure allows recovery of costs including
legal fees of the attorney. But it should be noticed that contingency fees are not permitted and
thus not recoverable.
91. For an early case, see Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (3 Dall. 1796). For a leading
modern case, see Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 270
(1975). See generally Joachim Zekoll, The Enforceability of American Money Judgments
Abroad: A Landmark Decision by the German Federal Court of Justice, 30 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 641, 649 (1992).
92. There are exceptions to this rule. For example, 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) provides that "[a]n
individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall recover actual
damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover
punitive damages." This indicates a differentiation between recovery of attorneys' fees and
punitive damages. By putting recovery of attorneys' fees under actual damages, and, thus, in
theoretical opposition to punitive damages, § 362(h) indicates that adjudicating attorneys' fees is
not in itself guided by punitive purposes. See 11 U.S.C § 362(h) (2000).
93. N.Y., Chi. & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Grodek, 186 N.E. 733 (Ohio 1933); New Orleans,
Jackson, & Great N.R.R. Co. v. Allbritton, 38 Miss. 242, 272-73 (1859). As to the compensatory
function of this part of punitive damages awards, see Rustad &Koenig, supra note 18, at 1321-
22; Note, supra note 2, at 1902; Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L.
REV. 517, 520-21 (1957).
2003]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
Second, punitive damages can be and are used to help when
there are difficulties in measuring the amount of compensatory
damages. This function of punitive damages can most easily be traced
in cases of damages for pain and suffering.94 Under a system where
damages for pain and suffering are restricted or not available, courts
tend to shift to the available system of punitive damages. Thus, U.S.
courts, up to the nineteenth century, seem to have intermingled
compensatory and punitive damages and have relied upon punitive
damages when compensation for pain and suffering could otherwise
not be awarded.9 5 Under a functional approach, as described above,
punitive damages and damages for pain and suffering are specifically
interrelated. Punitive damages serve a double-headed purpose when
they are used to give relief for pain and suffering. By punishing the
tortfeasor for his wrongful act, they focus on the tortfeasor and
persons like him. But at the same time, punitive damages focus on
the plaintiff, enabling him to be compensated for the harm he suf-
fered from the tortfeasor's wrongful act. From this point of view,
punitive damages, when used to award damages for pain and suffer-
ing, can be considered to be partly compensatory. This comes close
to what German law effectuates by awarding damages for pain and
suffering under the heading of "satisfaction" ("Genugtuung").
However, over the course of time, as courts became more willing to
include nonpecuniary losses within the scope of compensation for
pain and suffering, this partly compensatory function of punitive
damages seems to have been erased. 96
Finally, there is a third type of situation where punitive damages
may be used for compensatory purposes. Actual damages are some-
times rather difficult to prove. For example, this is the case in intel-
lectual property infringement and antitrust cases. Thus, multiple
damages awards may be used to bridge the difficulties in establishing
actual losses.97 But it should be noted that compensation awarded to
redress eventual losses but not actual losses is by no means purely
compensatory.
94. See Note, supra note 93, at 519.
95. See Cooper, 532 U.S. at 437-38 n.11; Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 61
(1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, supra note 93,
at 520 (addressing the "vacillation between compensatory and punitive theories ... [as] typical
of many early American cases... ").
96. See Note, supra note 93, at 520.
97. See id. at 521.
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E. Impact of Caps on Punitive Damages and Impact of Residuary
Compensatory Functions
We must now discuss whether caps on punitive damages under-
mine the deterrent effect and frustrate the remedy. 98 Eventually, caps
may allow potential tortfeasors to calculate in advance their maxi-
mum exposure, taking into consideration that eventual damages are
less than expected profits. Beyond such reasoning, it seems to be
evident that with caps, even when calculated according to the actual
damages, punitive damages do not lose their character. From a
theoretical point of view, these restrictions do not change the nature
of punitive damages. Even where limited to the amount of compen-
satory damages, their purpose is punishment. Punitive damages are
future-oriented and focus on the person of the tortfeasor. From a
practical perspective, such limitations may lead to a less hostile
attitude in foreign legislatures, as far as enforcement is concerned.
The reason is that it is not just the punitive nature of punitive dam-
ages that is an obstacle to enforcement, but also the unreasonable
amount of damages sometimes awarded under the heading of puni-
tive damages. Thus, once the general adverse attitude towards
punitive damages is overcome, the separate and distinct obstacle of
excessiveness may be reduced.
On the other hand, residual compensatory functions of punitive
damages do not change the conceptual idea of punitive damages in
itself. But it can make the punitive pillar of the system more easily
reconcilable with a pure compensatory system, and therefore may
allow partial enforcement of a punitive award.
III. THE SCHIZOPHRENIC GERMAN ATTITUDE TOWARDS PUNITIVE
DAMAGES- COMPENSATORY DEMANDS AND NONCOMPENSATORY
REALITY RECONSIDERED
The German attitude towards punitive damages is somewhat
schizophrenic. On the one hand, since the enactment of the German
Civil Code, the general German attitude toward punitive damages is
that damages have to be purely compensatory.99 The German law of
damages is a monistic system. What presumably does not fit into this
98. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 18, at 1277, for a discussion of the effect of capping
punitive damages.
99. See ESSER & SCHMIDT, supra note 5 at 159; HELMuT HEINRICHS, PALANDT,
BUERGERLICHES GESETZBUCH § 249, n.4 (61st ed. 2002).
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scheme will be labeled as exceptions. 1°° On the other hand, and
likewise since the beginning of the German Civil Code, there is a long
and steady line of court decisions that do not fit into this scheme. 10 1
German courts frequently awarded damages that could not seriously
be held to be purely compensatory because they tended to include
punitive elements. These decisions may be labeled as exceptions, as
the German legislature labeled them when drafting the Code.1°2 And
eventually they were exceptions in former times.
Anyhow, meanwhile these exceptions have increased not just in
number, but also in the different areas of application they concern.
They have been increasing at a steady rate, and have been nourished
by an influx of legislation. The number of exceptions is notably rising
by developments in the area of damages for infringement on the right
of personality and sex discrimination in employment. 10 3  These
developments will be discussed at length. For present purposes,
however, we only have to question whether the exceptions have
become a second pillar of the German law of damages, and whether
the traditional monistic system has turned into a dualistic system and
the gap between the American and the German law of damages has
narrowed.
We have to rely on a step-by-step analysis of courtroom reality to
determine whether the traditional system has been modified by more
than just exceptional noncompensatory elements, contrary to main-
stream lip service. Part III.A discusses the traditional, purely com-
pensatory approach and how it developed. Part III.B discusses the
implantation of noncompensatory elements into the German law of
damages. Part III.C discusses the indications of a shift toward an
implantation of punitive elements into the traditional system, which
may turn out to be the establishment of a second pillar within the
German law of damages.
100. See MOTIVE, supra note 19, § 728 at 799 (now Section 847 of the German Civil Code)
(addressing damages for pain and suffering). Damages for pain and suffering were not
considered to be purely compensatory at the time.
101. For a lengthy discussion of noncompensatory elements in German court decisions, see
PETER MUELLER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES UND DEUTSCHES SCHADENSERSATZRECHT 101 (2000);
see also infra Part III.A-C.
102. See supra note 100.
103. See infra Part III.
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A. The Traditional Approach Towards Punitive Damages in
Germany-A Purely Compensatory System with Rare Exceptions?
Until the nineteenth century, the German attitude toward puni-
tive damages was quite similar to what was discussed in the United
States at that time. There was no unanimous attitude as far as
noncompensatory, and particularly punitive, damages were con-
cerned. Punitive damages, although not available everywhere in
Germany, were quite common in some German states. For example,
on several occasions, the Prussian Civil Code allowed the courts to
award damages greater than the loss the plaintiff had suffered,
measuring damages in proportion to the fault of the tortfeasor. °4 On
the other hand, the Bavarian Civil Code stated that "as meanwhile
these torts are punished in criminal law," there was to be no more use
of double and quadruple actions.0° Anyhow, while in the United
States the more practical approach of Theodore Sedgwick won over
the more theoretical, dogmatic approach of Simon Greenleaf, 1°6 in
Germany, the war on punitive damages was decided in favor of a
monistic, compensatory system. During the nineteenth century,
influential legal scholars had opposed not only damages for pain and
suffering, but also the very idea of intermingling damages with
punishment. 17 They argued in favor of a strict separation of damages
in civil law and punishment in criminal law. But the German "war on
punitive damages" was only finally decided in the unification proce-
dure that led to the enactment of the German Civil Code of 1900.108
During the legislative procedure unifying the German civil law, it
was argued that damage awards, as a matter of principle, should have
the exclusive function to restore the losses caused by the wrongful
act. l09 As was resolved in the preparatory documents to the German
Civil Code, with respect to what later became sections 249 to 252,
"moralistic or penal aspects" should be kept away from civil law. 10
104. For a discussion of the split situation in pre-Code Germany, see MOTIVE, supra note
19, § 218 at 17.
105. 4 CODEX MAXIMILIANEUS BAVARICUS CIVILIS part 4, ch.15, § 5.
106. See supra Part II.
107. For a discussion of the debate on damages for pain and suffering (Schmerzensgeld), see
Sebok, supra note 2.
108. The author only relies on the Prussian and Bavarian attitudes. See MOTIVE, supra note
19, § 218 at 17, for additional examples.
109. See id. § 218, at 18.
110. "Inclusion of moral or penal points of view into the civil law of damages has to be kept
away from the determination of the civil law consequences of illicit behavior." Id. § 218, at 17
(author's translation).
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Punitive elements in the civil law of damages were considered to bc
contrary to the very idea of the law of damages, which is strictly
restricted to compensate the victim, while punishment is restricted to
criminal law sanctions. Addressing general principles that had to be
applied to all statutory regulations on damages, the preparatory
documents state:
Draft as to cases where damages are based on the fault of the re-
sponsible rejects the gradual system of the amount of damages ac-
cording to the type or grade of fault as it is given in several
codifications, namely the Prussian Civil Code. Inclusion of moral
and penal points of view (into the law of damages), on which this
differentiation is founded, must be kept aside in adjudicating the
civil law consequences of illicit and wrongful behavior. The princi-
ple of the common law according to which the amount of damages
caused delimits the amount of awardable damages from a legal
point of view is acceptable and alone gives justice to the person en-
titled to damages."'
At the same time, repudiation of punitive elements in the law of
damages was one of the central arguments for restricting damages for
pain and suffering to cases of bodily harm, thus excluding infringe-
ment of reputation from this type of damages. Pecuniary damages for
infringement of reputation were linked with the traditional actio
iniuriam aestimatoria, which was of a criminal character."'
Based on these ideas, the German Civil Code was enacted,
establishing a purely compensatory law of damages. Consequently,
general provisions on damages in the German Civil Code"13 address
reparation and compensation and include damages for lost profits." 4
In rare occasions, which must be specifically permitted,"5 recovery of
damages for pain and suffering is available. But there is not the
slightest hint of punitive damages ("Strafschadensersatz") in the
original code of 1900. Legislation seems to have erased the very idea
of punitive damages.
German courts and blackletter doctrine, in line with the legisla-
tive history and the German Civil Code, considered punitive damages
not to be a part of the German legal system. 116 Under the 1900
111. Id. § 218, at 17-18 (author's translation). This is similar to Simon Greenleaf's
statement. See GREENLEAF, supra note 17.
112. For a discussion of the legislative history, see BGHZ 7, 223.
113. §§ 249-53 BGB.
114. Id. § 252.
115. Id. § 253. For the recent extension of damages for pain and suffering see supra note 4.
116. See GRUNSKY, supra note 5, at n.3 (citing, among others, ESSER & SCHMIDT, supra
note 5; LARENZ, supra note 5).
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German Civil Code, jurisprudence immediately adopted this attitude,
at least at face value. Throughout the twentieth century, there was
almost no jurisprudence expressly awarding punitive damages. "7 On
the contrary, the German Federal Supreme Court frequently stressed
the exclusivity of the idea of compensation as fundamental to the law
of damages, at least until the second half of the twentieth century.
Damage awards should position the plaintiff to where he would be
had the damage not occurred. Punitive damages should not enrich
the plaintiff or aim to punish and deter the tortfeasor beyond the
general effect that is inherent in all obligations of damages.118 In early
decisions, the German Federal Supreme Court clearly stated that
damages for pain and suffering are purely compensatory, and that
punitive elements and the financial situation of the tortfeasor have to
be ignored." 9 Since 1900, German blackletter doctrine, like German
jurisprudence, states that damage awards have to be restricted to
compensation. °20 Noncompensatory elements are not part of the
German civil law of damages, but are strictly restricted to criminal
law. It is even questioned whether introduction of punitive elements
is reconcilable with constitutional law.1 21 The idea that damages have
to be restricted to compensation is most often highlighted when
German courts are faced with enforcing U.S. punitive damages
awards.122 Enforcement of foreign judgments is only available if the
result of the foreign judgment does not violate German public policy.
The restriction of damages to compensation is among the fundamen-
tal principles of German law, and punitive damages awards are
generally held to be contrary to German public policy. 123
117. The German Federal Supreme Court, e.g., declined to take into consideration the
financial situation of the tortfeasor because damages for pain and suffering should have no
punitive function at all. BGHZ 7, 223.
118. See id. But see BGHZ 18, 149 (relying on the tortfeasor's financial situation by
awarding nonpunitive damages for pain and suffering).
119. BGHZ7,23.
120. See GRUNSKY, supra note 5, at n.3 (citing, among others, ESSER & SCHMIDT, supra
note 5; LARENZ, supra note 5).
121. Christiane Siemes, Gewinnabschoepfung bei Zwangskommerzialisierung der
Persoenlichkeit durch die Presse, ARCHIV FUER DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS [AcP] 201, 202, 212
(2001).
122. See infra Part V.
123. See id.
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B. Step-by-Step Reintroduction of Noncompensatory Elements Into
the German Law of Damages
But the text of the German Civil Code and the mainstream posi-
tion in literature are far from mirroring reality. A more detailed
analysis of cases demonstrates that courts frequently award damages
that cannot seriously be considered purely compensatory. Instead, in
a large variety of situations, courts frequently rely on arguments, and
come to conclusions, that are not aimed at exclusively compensating
the victim for losses suffered, nor are retrospective or victim or loss-
oriented. Thus, the awards are noncompensatory and consistent with
punitive damages arguments, conclusions, and consequences, and at
least come close to the idea of punitive damages.1 14 Even in modern
legislation, one may find elements that cannot be considered purely
compensatory. For his recent dissertation, Peter Mueller investigated
court decisions awarding damages that, at least partially, do not fit
into a scheme of compensatory damages. 125 He outlined nineteen
different situations where damages are not strictly restricted to
compensation, but instead include elements that, according to his
understanding, must be labeled punitive.11 6 In some of these situa-
tions, it may be questionable whether courts really take a punitive
damages approach. In other situations, a nondamages approach
might have been available, although it was not accepted by the courts.
But there seems to exist an extensive amount of case law in which
courts do not fully comply with the purely compensatory system of
damages. 2 ' The most important situations that compare reality to the
fundamental principle of the German law of damages are discussed as
well as the question of whether punitive damages have been reintro-
duced into the German legal system as an additional principle of
compensatory damages.
1. The Irresistible Progress of Implementing Noncompensatory
Elements into Damages for Pain and Suffering
For many reasons, the analysis has to start with damages for pain
and suffering. First, what was, and still is, happening in the field of
damages for pain and suffering touches the very heart of almost two
124. See infra III.B.1-3.
125. See MUELLER, supra note 101.
126. See id. at 101-296.
127. See infra III.B.1-3.
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hundred years of an increasingly hostile attitude of German domestic
law towards punitive damages. 128 Second, damages for pain and
suffering have undergone a strange career during the last few years. 129
Third, and most important, damages for pain and suffering have to be
the starting point because German law in other areas of damages
relies on ideas that have been developed in this field.
In order to better understand what is happening, the develop-
ments since the introduction of the German Civil Code have to be
outlined. Similar to punitive damages during the nineteenth century,
some of the major and most important German states did not allow
damages for pain and suffering. However, 130 damages for pain and
suffering were available in other German states. The rejection of
damages for pain and suffering was founded on dogmatic, as well as
practical, reasons. First, there was the idea that pain and suffering
constituted nonpecuniary loss, and that only pecuniary loss could be
compensated by money. Hence, the law of damages seemed to
exclude damages for pain and suffering.131 Second, there was the idea
that it was almost impossible to calculate damages for pain and
suffering without taking into consideration the degree of fault of the
tortfeasor. But the degree of fault, again for dogmatic reasons, was
not a permissible parameter in determining the amount of damages.
The degree of fault was a parameter in determining whether an action
may lead to damages, but not in determining the amount of damages.
As was stated in the preparatory documents to the German Civil
Code, "[t]he principle of the common law according to which only the
amount of losses caused by the tort exclusively determines the
amount of damages to be restituted, was the only legally safe princi-
ple and was the only one to give justice to the victim. '' 132 Third, there
was the idea that, at least in the field of damages for injuries to
reputation, pecuniary compensation was somehow disgusting.33
128. See supra notes 104-15 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Sebok, supra note 2 (highlighting the "strange career of satisfaction in
German law.").
130. This was mostly influenced by French law, which was in force in major parts of western
German territories, and Swiss law.
131. As to the development of this idea in the nineteenth century legal literature, see Karin
Nehlsen-v. Stryk, Schmerzensgeld ohne Genugtuung, JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 119 (1987); see also
Sebok, supra note 2.
132. See MOTIVE, supra note 19, § 218 at 18 (regarding general regulations on damages)
(this is now §§ 249-53 of the German Civil Code).
133. See, e.g., URSULA STEIN, MUENCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BUERGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCH, SCHULDRECHT, BESONDERER TEIL III § 847, at 2063 n.2 (3d ed. 1997).
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Despite this historic split, damages for pain and suffering nevertheless
were introduced into the Civil Code, but obviously with some hesita-
tion and under the proviso that they should be available only in cases
for which the Code explicitly provided for them.134 Damages for pain
and suffering were considered to be an exception to the general rule
that damages were to be restricted to pecuniary losses.'35 Neverthe-
less, it seemed to be necessary to allow damages for pain and suffer-
ing at least in cases of bodily harm or deprivation of liberty to
harmonize the new, unified civil law with criminal law, which had
been unified since 1877. The "decisive 136 motivation for introducing
an exceptional claim for damages for pain and suffering was the fact
that in criminal cases, the judge was entitled to order that atonement
(Busse) be paid to the victim. 137 Mostly in order to avoid discrepan-
cies between what a criminal judge and a civil judge were entitled to
award, section 782 of the draft, which later became section 847 of the
German Civil Code, allowed claims for damages for pain and suffer-
ing. 38 This atonement argument plainly indicates that, at that time,
damages for pain and suffering were considered not to be strictly
compensatory. Atonement definitely is different from compensation.
According to its intent to transfer the criminal law concept of atone-
ment to the civil law of damages, this type of damages was considered
not truly compensatory.
For more than half a century while courts were awarding small
damage awards for pain and suffering,139 the general attitude towards
134. § 253 BGB.
135. See MOTIVE, supra note 19, § 728 at 799 (now § 847 of the German Civil Code).
136. The preparatory documents state the following argument to be "ausschlaggebend,"
meaning decisive.
137. The historical background which led to the introduction of damages for pain and
suffering into the new Civil Code is laid down in the preparatory documents at draft section 728
which later became section 847 of the German Civil Code. See also Nehlsen-v. Stryk, supra note
131.
138. Former Section 847 German Civil Code which recently has been abolished due to the
2002 extension of section 253 reads as follows:
(1) In case of injury to body or health as well as in the case of deprivation of liberty,
the victim may as well demand fair compensation in money for non-pecuniary dam-
ages. (2) A similar claim is given to a woman against whom an immoral crime or of-
fence is committed, or who is induced by cunning or by threats, or by the abuse of a
relationship of dependence to permit extra-marital cohabitation.
139. Pre-Caroline I jurisprudence of the German Federal Supreme Court had limited
damages for pain and suffering in case of violation of the right to personality to about DM
10.000. See, e.g., BGHZ 26, 349 (351) (DM 10.000); BGHZ 35, 363 (365) (DM 8.000); BGHZ
39, 124 (127) (DM 10.000. Only in its Caroline I decision of November 15, 1994, BGHZ 128, 1
(5), the Supreme Court reversed a DM 30.000 judgment because the amount was too small. The
Court of Appeals then rendered judgment increasing the awarded damages to DM 180.000. For
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these types of damages underwent significant changes, adding new
questions regarding the compensatory function of this type of damage
award. Departure from a purely compensatory approach towards
damages for pain and suffering took place when the German Federal
Supreme Court began to reevaluate damages for pain and suffering.
In a famous 1955 judgment, the German Federal Supreme Court gave
up its traditional and purely monistic classification of damages for
pain and suffering, stating:
The claim for damages for pain and suffering under section 847
German Civil Code is not an ordinary claim for damages but in-
stead a claim of its own character bearing a twofold function: This
claim shall give to the victim adequate compensation for damages
which are not pecuniary, and at the same time it shall take into ac-
count that the tortfeasor owes satisfaction for what he did to the
victim. 140
Thus, finally the idea of satisfaction that had been discussed during
the nineteenth century found its way back into German jurisprudence.
Another important alteration can be found in decisions awarding
damages for pain and suffering in cases of violation of the right to
personality by the press. First, the German Federal Supreme Court,
deviating from well-established decisions of its predecessor, the
Imperial Court,141 developed a general right to personality as a right
protected by tort law.142 Such a right had been discussed in the
legislative procedure, but had not been introduced into the German
Civil Code.1 43 Second, the Federal Supreme Court by analogy ex-
tended damages for pain and suffering to claims for violation of the
right to personality, which was not specifically mentioned in section
847 of the German Civil Code and, thus, was contrary to section 253,
which restricted these types of damages to claims specifically ad-
a detailed discussion, see Tilman Ulrich Amelung, Damage Awards for Infringement of
Privacy- The German Approach, 14 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 15, 19 (1999).
140. BGHZ 18, 149 (149).
141. See, e.g., RGZ 69, 401 (403); RGZ 79, 397 (398); RGZ 94, 1(3).
142. See, e.g., BGHZ 13, 334 (334); see also Amelung, supra note 139, at 18-32 (giving a
more detailed discussion of this case and the following cases). Some of these cases are available
in English translation in BASIL S. MARKESINIS, THE GERMAN LAW OF OBLIGATIONS, VOLUME
II: THE LAW OF TORTS (3d ed. 1997).
143. For more recent yet ineffective attempts to introduce a general right to personality into
the German Civil Code, see URSULA STEIN, MUENCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM




dressed by statutory regulations. 144 In a famous 1958 decision, the
German Federal Supreme Court awarded damages for pain and
suffering for abuse of the photo of a famous person in a humiliating
type of advertisement,'145 although (1) section 253 permitted damages
for pain and suffering only in cases enumerated in the Code; (2) the
right to personality was not listed in section 847; (3) in the course of
formation of the Civil Code there was discussion on introducing a
general right to personality in section 847 but the idea was rejected;
and thus (4) there was no reasonable legal basis for the decision
either under the Code or by way of analogy. In subsequent decisions,
the German Federal Supreme Court reached the same result. 146 The
German Federal Constitutional Court held this development to be
constitutional based on the strong protection the right to personality
received under the German Constitution. 47
More interesting than the expansion of a claim beyond express
restrictions in the Code is a specific restriction on such a claim and
the argument used in measuring the damages. The Supreme Court
restricted the claim to situations of serious fault or significant in-
fringement of the right to personality. In introducing this restric-
tion,'148 the court relied in part on tortfeasor-oriented considerations.
Moreover, the court did not restrict the scope of damages to what and
how the victim suffered, but also considered the motives of the
defendant.149
While the restriction on cases of serious infringement of the right
to personality may be neglected, restriction on cases of serious fault
cannot because the degree of fault in compensatory damages is
insignificant. Thus, this restriction apparently is based on noncom-
pensatory ideas. Measuring damages according to the motives of the
144. Former Section 253 of the German Civil Code made available money damages for pain
and suffering "only as provided by law." This wording does not allow for an extension by
analogy.
145. BGHZ 26, 349; see also Amelung, supra note 139, at 20.
146. BGHZ 35, 363 (367).
147. BVerfGE 34, 269 (269).
148. This restriction is rarely mentioned in German law, but when it is, it is typically referred
to as a "curiosity." PETER SCHWERDTNER, MUENCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM
BUERGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH, ALLGEMEINER TEIL BAND I, § 12 n.287 (3d ed. 1993).
149. BGHZ 35, 363 (369) (taking into consideration that in a case of violation of the right to
personality by the press, a substantial risk should be put on the tortfeasor because the
interference with the victim's rights is generally based on economic motives); see also BVerfGE
34, 269 (286) (taking into consideration that in a case of violation of the right to personality by
the press, interference with the victim's rights is generally based on economic motives);
MUELLER, supra note 101, at 277.
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tortfeasor is still noncompensatory. Again, this could no longer be
called compensatory because the focus of compensation is not strictly
restricted to what the victim suffered.
The argument for enlarging section 847 of the Code to encom-
pass the right to personality was that the Federal Supreme Court
wanted to protect the defendant's rights by sanctioning the defendant
in order to deter him and others from engaging in similar behavior. 10
As it was phrased in a decision a few years later, "without a civil law
sanction of this type the legal system would sacrifice the most effec-
tive and sometimes the only means to safeguard respect towards the
personality of other people." ''
Highlighting the addition of the noncompensatory function of
damages for pain and suffering in the case of violation of the right to
personality, the court expressed that such damages were only avail-
able in cases where there was aggravated fault of the defendant and
an important violation of the right to personality had occurred.'52
Because the defendant had violated the plaintiff's right to personality
to derive a profit, the court connected damages with the motives of
the defendant's acts. 153
The technical means for implementing wrong-oriented and
tortfeasor-oriented considerations into the law of damages was the
notion of satisfaction (Genugtuung). Without abandoning the con-
cept of compensatory damages, satisfaction was generally applied to
damages for pain and suffering; however, in cases of infringement of
the right to personality, satisfaction became a central inquiry. 154
Satisfaction transformed the wrong-oriented and tortfeasor-oriented
views into a victim-oriented view.
Reliance on aspects derived from the wrongful act and the
wrongdoer was transferred into victim-oriented considerations and
was justified by the idea that such a transformation was necessary to
adequately satisfy the victim. The idea that an adequate sanction had
to placed on the tortfeasor in order to provide a victim with sufficient
compensation had already been developed in the nineteenth cen-
150. BGHZ 35, 363 (368) (relying on the idea that without a sanction of this type a legal
system would waive the most effective, and oftentimes only, means to safeguard respect of the
right to personality of the victim); see also BVerfGE 34, 269 (274) (accepting this idea).
151. BGHZ 35, 363 (368) (author's translation).
152. Id. at 369.
153. Id.
154. BGHZ 26, 349 (353); see also MUELLER, supra note 101, at 277-81.
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tury. 155 In cases of infringement of the right to personality, this
became the decisive approach. 56
Restricting damages to cases of aggravated fault of the defendant
is a significant deviation from traditional notions of the law of dam-
ages. It addresses the tortfeasor and his behavior, a perspective
generally without significance to the law of compensatory damages
where the focus has exclusively been on the victim and what the
victim lost. Creating a "sanction to safeguard respect" is more
punitive than compensatory language.
Meanwhile, the German Federal Supreme Court has advanced
one step further, going from compensation to punitive damages. In
the famous cases of Princess Caroline of Monaco, 57 the Court multi-
plied the amount of damages well beyond the pre-existing ceiling in
violation of the right to personality cases. The case itself is by no
means special as compared with earlier cases: a journal published a
fake interview pretending it was a real interview with Princess Caro-
line of Monaco.
The facts are almost identical to the facts of a case where a jour-
nal published a fake interview with former empress Soraya of Iran158
But unlike the decision in the empress' case, the Federal Supreme
Court reversed the judgment of the lower court (the Superior Court
Hamburg) because the amount of damages awarded was held to be
insufficient. The Federal Supreme Court no longer relied on the idea
of damages for pain and suffering. Instead, it relied directly on the
constitution. Moreover, the Federal Supreme Court expressly stated
that the amount had to be determined in such a way that the commis-
sion of similar torts would be deterred. To this goal, the profits of the
tortfeasor had to be taken from him. Such outcomes are the result of
purely punitive damages argumentation.'59
155. See Sebok, supra note 2.
156. See, e.g., BGHZ 26, 349 (353); BGHZ 35,363 (369).
157. BGHZ 128, 1 (1). This case is known as "Caroline F' because it was followed by
several other "Caroline" cases. E.g., Supreme Court, 15 NJW 984 (1996) ("Caroline II" decided
in 1995); BGHZ 131, 332 ("Caroline III" decided in 1995); 15 NJW 985 (1996) ("Caroline's son"
decided in 1995). For a discussion of these subsequent cases, see Amelung, supra note 139, at
25-27.
158. BVerfGE 34, 269 (269).
159. It is argued that the same result could be reached based on an unjust enrichment
approach. See Christiane Siemes, Gewinnabschopfung bei Zwangskommerzialisierung der
Persoinlichkeit durch die Presse, 201 ARCHIV FUER DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS [AcP], Feb. 2001,
at 214-24 (2001). But the Supreme Court did not rely on an unjust enrichment approach;
instead it relied on damages.
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2. A Grey Area Between Compensation, Unjust Enrichment, and
Punitive Damages-Noncompensatory Damages in Intellectual
Property Infringement
In a line of decisions about intellectual property infringement
reaching back to pre-Code times,16 German courts including the
German Imperial Court and the Federal Supreme Court allowed a
plaintiff to determine the damages he had suffered in three different
ways. Courts started by admitting these three ways of determining
damages in copyright cases, 161 applying them in patent infringement
cases, 162 and then extending them for protection of registered design1 63
and similar intellectual property rights.16 Finally, after some hesita-
tion, 65 courts now rely on these methods in any case of unfair compe-
tition.t66
According to these methods, a plaintiff may either determine his
damages by demonstrating the losses he suffered, or by requesting the
amount that the defendant reasonably had to pay had he asked for a
license, or by asking for what the defendant had earned by intruding
upon the plaintiff's intellectual property rights.1 67 In some areas,
reasonable license fees are even doubled.168
The first method of calculation is based on sections 251 and 252
of the Code, restricted to strictly compensatory damages, and aimed
at providing compensation for losses suffered. This method is
plaintiff-oriented, loss-oriented, and retroactive. The two other
methods, however, are not strictly compensatory. They allow the
plaintiff to recover damages even in cases where he had never been
willing to grant a license, and even in cases where the defendant's
profits are over and above what the plaintiff himself reasonably could
have expected to gain by exploring his intellectual property rights.
Thus, they do not purely aim at compensating losses suffered; instead,
160. This jurisprudence reaches back to a famous decision of the Imperial Court
(Reichsgericht) of the late nineteenth century. See RGZ 35, 63; MUELLER, supra note 101, at
101-21.
161. RGZ35,63.
162. RGZ 43, 56 (58) (relying on RGZ 35, 63).
163. RGZ 50, 111 (115)
164. Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urheberrecht [GRUR] [Supreme Court] 1963, 640.
165. BGHZ 57, 116 (120) (stating that differences in involved interests forbid a general and
undifferentiated adaptation of these methods to all types of unfair competition).
166. BGHZ 122, 262 (262).
167. See RGZ 35, 63; BGHZ 57, 116.
168. BGHZ 17,376 (383).
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they are tortfeasor-oriented and profit-erasing as opposed to victim-
oriented and loss-oriented.
Although these alternative methods of calculating damages could
be based on a theory of unjust enrichment, 169 courts adhere to a tort
damages approach.170 Eventually, there is a compensatory damages
background. The alternative methods of calculating damages were
developed, among other reasons, to avoid the difficulties of establish-
ing actual damages. 7'
The line of argument taken by the courts in allowing the third
method of calculating damages reveals additional noncompensatory
aspects.1 72  As embodied by English Lord Chancellor Hatherly's
statement, "This Court never allows a man to make profit by a
wrong."'73 Similarly, German courts openly confess that in intellec-
tual property infringement cases, alternative methods of calculating
the amount that the tortfeasor has to pay are based on natural justice
views that a tortfeasor should not profit from his wrong.17 4
The Federal Supreme Court directly stated, "[i]n order to sanc-
tion the damaging behavior, we presuppose that the owner of the
intellectual property right would have earned the same profit the
tortfeasor has earned.' 1 75 Thus, the Court focused more on the
tortfeasor than on the victim, and more on the damaging act than on
the loss of the victim. Both foci are contrary to pure compensation.
Consequently, the literature addressing these methods of calculation
describe said methods as being functionally "repressive atonement"'7 6
169. This approach is administered by some legal writers. See, e.g., Ernst von Caemmerer,
Bereicherung und unerlaubte Handlung, FESTSCHRIFr FUER ERNST RABEL I, 354 (1954); Walter
Wilburg, Zusammenspiel der Kraefte im Aufbau des Schuldrechts, 163 ACP, Nov. 1963, at 351.
For a similar approach in case of infringement to the right to personality, see Siemes, supra note
159, at 214-24.
170. At least since the decision of the Imperial Court on October 22, 1930, RGZ 130, 108
(110), courts have characterized all three methods of calculating what the plaintiff is entitled to
in intellectual property infringement as "truly damages." Courts are somehow trapped into a
damages approach as they do not give the plaintiff the option of all three approaches at the
same time, but instead demand that the plaintiff decide in advance which method of calculation
he wants to have applied. This restriction is not imposed in an unjust enrichment approach
because damages and unjust enrichment under German law can be demanded not only in the
alternative, but cumulatively as well.
171. As to similar considerations under American law, see Note, supra note 94, at 521 nn.
36-38 (1957).
172. MUELLER, supra note 101, at 108.
173. Jegon v. Vivian, L.R. 6 Ch. App., 742, 761 (1871). This idea was introduced into the
German discussion by Fritz Schulz, System der Rechte des Eingriffserwerbs, 105 ACP, 1909, at 1.
174. See, e.g., RGZ 144,187 (190); BGHZ 57, 116 (119).
175. BGHZ 68, 90 (94) (author's translation).
176. Ernst Steindorff, Abstrakte und konkrete Schadensberechnung, 158 ACP, 1959, at 455.
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or a "socio-psychological efficient instrument to enforce lawful
conduct.
1 77
Meanwhile, some areas of intellectual property law legislation
have adopted the third method of calculating damages, relying on
differentiations that can no longer be explained under a compensa-
tory damages approach: 7 8 other intellectual property acts direct that
in case the violation of the respective intellectual property right was
done negligently instead of purposefully, the court may award an
amount in between the damages suffered and the gain achieved.79
Such differentiation according to defendant's fault goes beyond a
compensatory approach. Simultaneous consideration of the damages
suffered and the gains achieved shifts the perspective away from the
victim and towards the tortfeasor. This is especially true where the
profits derived from the wrongful act do not mirror the profits the
victim could have made himself but for the tortfeasor's actions.
3. Necessary Compliance With European Community
Requirements for Punishment Erasing German Traditional Notions
of Compensatory Damages-Noncompensatory Damages For Sex
Discrimination in Employment
The most obvious step towards punitive damages has been taken
in modern German labor law, where labor and contract law intersect.
In contract law neither damages for pain and suffering nor punitive
damages were available under the German Civil Code.
However, the situation changed dramatically based on the 1976
enactment of European Community Directive 76/207/EEC ("Direc-
tive"). The Directive called for the equal treatment of men and
women,11 and it had to be transformed by member states no later
than thirty months after notification. This Directive seemed to have
no special impact on the domestic law of damages. It demanded the
abolishment of all domestic laws contrary to the principle of equal
177. Joachim Schmidt-Salzer, Zur Technik der topischen Rechtsbildung: Angemessene
Lizenzgebuehr und Verletzergewinn als Grundlage der Schadensberechnung, JURISTISCHE
RUNDSCHAU, March 1969, at 87 (author's translation).
178. Gesetz ueber Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte (Urheberrechtsgesetz), v.
9.9.65 (BGBI. I S.1273); see also MUELLER, supra note 101, at 113; HAIMO SCHACK, URHEBER
UND URHEBERVERTRAGSRECHT 341 n.691 (2d ed. 2001).
179. See, e.g., Patentgesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung, v. 16.12.80 (BGBI. 1981 S.
139).
180. Council Directive 76/207/EEC of February 9, 1976 on the implementation of the
principle of equal treatment for men and women regarding access to employment, vocational
training and promotion, and working conditions. 1976 O.J. (L 039) 1-2.
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treatment and the introduction of necessary measures to procure
judicial recourse for persons wronged by failure to comply with the
principle of equal treatment. 8  Member states could choose what
types of claims they would hear.
While transforming the Directive into domestic German law in
1980, the German legislation introduced section 611a into the Code
prohibiting sex discrimination in employment.182 In labor contracts,
employers were forbidden from discriminating based on sex. This
prohibition applied to all types of contractual provisions, including
the formation of labor contracts. Additionally, it applied to unilateral
measures such as career development, orders to the employee, and
cancellation of the contract. In a case of sex discrimination, section
611a(2) authorized employees to bring claims for damages against an
actual or prospective employer.
Within a short time, section 611a became famous in cases of dis-
crimination in the job selection procedure. The decisive wording of
the 1980 version of section 611a(2) states:
In case a labor relationship has not been entered into due to viola-
tion of the prohibition of discrimination for which the employer is
responsible, as3 the employer is liable in damages the employee suf-
fered from believing formation of a labor relationship would not
fail due to such violation. 84
This was fully in line with traditional German contract law. Liability
of the employer depended on fault, and the sanction was damages.
181. The decisive sections of Directive 76/207/EEC read:
Article 3
1. Application of the principle of equal treatment means that there shall be no dis-
crimination whatsoever on grounds of sex in the conditions, including selection crite-
ria, for access to all jobs or posts, whatever the sector or branch of activity, and to all
levels of the occupational hierarchy.
2. To this end, Member States shall take the measures necessary to ensure that:
(a) any laws, regulations and administrative provisions contrary to the principle of
equal treatment shall be abolished;...
Article 6
Member States shall introduce into their national legal systems such measures as are
necessary to enable all persons who consider themselves wronged by failure to apply to
them the principle of equal treatment within the meaning of Articles 3, 4 and 5 to
pursue their claims by judicial process after possible recourse to other competent
authorities.
182. Additionally, in 1994 a statute was enacted prohibiting sexual harassment in the
workplace, Gleichberechtigungsgesetz, v. 21.04.94 (BGBI. I S.1406, 1412). Based on this statute,
courts are becoming more willing to award damages for pain and suffering. See TOBIAS
MAESTLE, DER ZIVILRECHTLICHE SCHUTZ VOR SEXUELLER BELAESTIGUNG AM
ARBEITSPLATZ 90 (2000).
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When a contract had not yet been formed, damages were restricted to
those that arose from a belief (Vertrauensschaden).185 Consequently,
in applying section 611a, labor courts generally restricted damages to
frustrated costs of application. 18
Such jurisprudence fits into traditional German notions of
contract law and damages. Damages for fault in precontractual
behavior are restricted to damages arising out of belief and are
therefore purely compensatory. They aim at compensating the loss of
the victim and are victim-oriented, loss-oriented, and retrospective.187
A potential employee who is discriminated against during the applica-
tion procedure suffers minimal actual losses. Consequently, under
section 611a and in line with the general principle of compensation,
damages for injured potential employees were restricted to nominal
amounts.
But this was just the beginning of a long-lasting controversy be-
tween German courts and legislation on the one hand, and the
European Court of Justice ("European Court") on the other hand. In
a famous decision of April 10, 1984, the European Court held that the
German transformation of the Directive was inadequate.188 The
European Court argued that the Directive, although it did not explic-
itly mention a sanction for failure to comply with the equal treatment
requirements, demanded such sanction, "as to guarantee real and
effective judicial protection" for the employee and as to have a "real
deterrent effect on the employer." This meant that "where a member
state chooses to penalize breaches that prohibition by the award of
compensation, that compensation must in any event be adequate in
relation to the damage sustained.' 18 9
Furthermore, the European Court argued that although the
Directive gave the member states the freedom to choose between the
different solutions suitable for achieving its objectives,
185. Damages arising out of a belief in the other party's contractual obligations are
restricted to cases where a contract has not been concluded. See HEINRICHS, supra note 100, at
n.17; see also §§ 122, 179 BGB.
186. E.g., Arbeitsgericht [Labor trial court], Hamm judgment of July 5,1982, available at 29
Betriebs-Berater 1858 (1983) (awarding DM 2.31 for postage instead of claim for DM 12.000 for
six-months wages).
187. The plaintiff is to be put in the position he would have been had he not entered into the
contract. See Supreme Court, 4 NJW 230 (1990); see also HEINRICHS, supra note 99.
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it nevertheless requires that if a member state chooses to penalize
breaches of that prohibition by the award of compensation, then in
order to ensure that it is effective and that it has a deterrent effect,
that compensation must in any event be adequate in relation to the
damage sustained and must therefore amount to more than purely
nominal compensation such as, for example, the reimbursement
only of the expenses incurred in connection with the application. 19°
Finally, the European Court called on the German courts "to inter-
pret their national law in the light of the wording and the purpose of
Directive 76/207/EEC"' 9' in order to achieve the result required by
article 189(3).
It is vain to discuss whether the European Court overextended
the Directive in inventing the requirement of a sanction of this type.
Under the well-established doctrine of "effet utile,"192 such interpreta-
tion by the European Court is quite common. It is also vain to
further discuss the methodologically questionable invention of
"compensation," which must have a "deterrent effect." Finally, it is
vain to discuss whether the equalization of small amounts of compen-
satory damages with nominal damages is methodologically sound.
What is most important is that the European Court expressly
connected a punitive function of damages to the required sanction
(even where given under the heading of compensation), and that the
sanction had to cause a deterrent effect. 193 What the European Court
asked for by this requirement was not just the deteriorating effect
inherent to every obligation to restitute damages, but additional
deterrence instead. Hence, the European Court demanded imple-
mentation of tortfeasor-oriented, future-oriented elements into the
domestic law of damages. The ruling stated that whatever solution a
member state chose in order to appropriately transform the Directive,
the solution had to be appropriate to penalize infringement of the
prohibition of discrimination. 94
In order to comply with the European Court, the German Fed-
eral Labor Court occasionally took a tort approach, awarding dam-
190. Id.
191. Id. at 453.
192. See PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS
217-36 (2d ed. 1998).
193. Von Colson, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. at 453-54.
194. Id. at 454-55 (Ruling no. 3). The court has repeated this theme that damages must
penalize discrimination. See Case C-177/88, Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voor Jong
Volwassenen, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3941, 1-3963; Case C-180/95, Draehmpaehl v. Urania Immobilien-
service oHG, 1997 E.C.R. 1-2195, 1-2220.
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ages for infringement of the right to personality. 195 But it was evident
that based on this approach damages would be available only in rare
cases.
To better comply with requirerients of the Directive as inter-
preted by the European Court, section 611a was altered by legisla-
tion.196 In its final version, section 611a makes available to the actual
or prospective employee discriminated against a claim for adequate
pecuniary compensation, which has a ceiling of three-months wages.
These damages are available even in cases where the employee had
not been employed and in cases of nondiscriminatory behavior during
the employee selection process.1 97
A precise and conclusive translation of section 611a is almost im-
possible. One of the interesting alterations of the 1980 version can
only be explained. While the original version of the text expressly
used the wording "restitution of damages" ("Ersatz des Schadens"),
the existing version says only "adequate compensation" ("ange-
messene Entschaedigung").198 The drafters seem to have made an
effort to avoid the wording "restitution of damages." Regardless,
adequate compensation is the wording already used under section 847
that allows damages for pain and suffering. 199
Nonetheless, there is a slight distinction between the new section
611a and the traditional section 847. In section 847 the words "ade-
quate compensation" are combined with the words "restitution of
damages" while in section 611a the word "damages" is not used at all.
The drafters presumably were aware that this was no longer restitu-
tion of damages in the traditional compensatory sense.
More interesting and important is that under section 611a(2),
damages have to be awarded independent of losses. Thus, they are
no longer compensatory, or at least they do not aim at compensation
for pecuniary losses. Comparison with section 847 may show the new
195. BAGE 61,209.
196. See § 611a BGB.
197. § 611a BGB of the German Civil Code reads:
(2) In case the employer in the course of the application procedure violates the
prohibition of discrimination under § 1 the applicant thus discriminated may demand
adequate compensation in money; a claim for establishing a labor relationship does not
exist.
(3) In case the applicant had not been employed even in case of non discrimina-
tory treatment, the employer has to pay an adequate compensation not higher than
three month prospective wages.... (author's translation).
198. § 611a Nr. 2 BGB.
199. See sources cited supra note 138.
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section 611a to be an additional case of damages for pain and suffer-
ing. Still, the European Court had demanded a deterrent effect.
Therefore, the preparatory documents on the new section 611a state
that in measuring damages, courts should take into consideration the
gravity of the injury, the cause and motives of the act, and the com-
munity law requirement of deterrence. 00
In light of this, it is peculiar that many commentaries on section
611a still argue that it is not punitive damages. It is said that punitive
damages are a problem from a constitutional law perspective, where
punishment is left exclusively to criminal courts.20 1 Thus, section 611a
should not allow punitive damages. This comes pretty close to the
absurd argument that nothing can exist that is not allowed to exist.
But this again is not the end of the story. The European Court of
Justice held that the new section 611a(2) of the German Civil Code
was an inadequate transformation of Directive 76/207/EEC. In a
famous decision of April 22, 1997,202 the court again insisted that even
civil liability was meant to penalize discrimination, that civil law
compensation must guarantee real and effective judicial protection,
that it must have a real deterrent effect on the employer, and must be
adequate in relation to the damage sustained. Consequently, a ceiling
on the amount of damages is not permitted. 20 3 Moreover, the court
ruled that Directive 76/207/EEC, particularly articles 2(1) and 3(1),
preclude provisions of domestic law, which make reparation of
damage suffered as a result of gender discrimination in the making of
an appointment subject to the requirement of fault. 20 4 Thus, German
courts now have to interpret section 611a(2) of the German Civil
Code to allow for damages that adequately deter the defendant and
other employers from discriminating based on gender. Courts in
member states have to follow the rulings of the European Court of
Justice, and courts in Germany traditionally do follow this line of
reasoning.
Equal treatment Directive 76/207/EEC and its transformation
into section 611a of the German Civil Code was exceptional and
200. Regierungsbegruendung, (argument of the government in introcducing the alteration to
section 611a), BT-Drucks. 12/5468, at 44.
201. MUELLER-GLOEGE, MUENCHENER KOMMENTAR ZUM BUERGERLICHEN
GESETZBUCH, SCHULDRECHT BESONDERER TElL III, § 611a, at 304 n.47 (3d ed. 1997).
202. Case C-180/95, Draehmpaehl v. Urania Immovbilienservice oHG, 1997 E.C.R. 1-2195.
203. Id. at 1-2221-23.
204. Id. at 1-2219-20; see also Case C-177/88, Dekker v. Stichting Vormingscentrum voor
Jong Volwassenen, 1990 E.C.R. 1-3941, 1-3976.
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rather unique. Yet it was but the beginning of a development. In
2000, the European Union enacted two more Directives regarding
equal treatment, Directive 2000/78/EEC25 prohibiting direct or
indirectiabor law discrimination and harassment based on religion or
belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation, 206 and Directive
2000/43/EEC 27 prohibiting discrimination on the basis of racial or
ethnic origin. 2° Again, article 17 of Directive 2000/78/EEC and
article 15 of Directive 2000/43/EEC demand "effective, proportional,
and deterrent" sanctions. The 2001 German transformation statute,
which is meant to transform directive 2000/43/EEC into German law
and which, up to now, exists as a draft,209 is planning to introduce a
claim for damages phrased the same way as new section 611a of the
Civil Code ("adequate pecuniary compensation") and even provides
for claims for specific performance. 210 Hence, it can be expected that
in the future, punitive aspects will form a permanent element in
German labor law, at least as far as discrimination in employment is
concerned.
C. Can Exceptions From Noncompensatory Damages be Considered
Punitive Damages?
As demonstrated above, under German law there are situations
in which damages are awarded that clearly cannot be regarded as
purely compensatory.211 In order to classify such damages as punitive,
they have to comply with the criteria of punitive damages; specifi-
cally, they have to aim at punishment and deterrence. Instead of
victim-related, loss-related, and retrospective they have to be
tortfeasor-related, action-related, and prospective.
205. Council Directive 2000/78, Establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in
Employment and Occupation, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16.
206. Id. at 18, art. 1.
207. Council Directive 2000/43/EC, Implementing the Principle of Equal Treatment
between Persons Irrespective of Racial or Ethnic Origin, 2000 O.J. (L 180) 22.
208. Id. at 24, art. 1.
209. For a proposed draft of § 319e of the Civil Code, see Diskussionsentwurf eines
Gesetzes zur Verhinderung von Diskriminierung im Zivilrecht [Discussion draft of an
antidiscrimination law], Department of Justice, 10 December 2001, available at
http://www.jura.uniaugsburg.de/altepage/Fakultaet/moellers/mat-frsetde.html.
210. See Thomas M. J. Moellers, Einschraenkung der Vertrags- und Gestaltungsfreiheit durch
Europaeische Richtlinien, FESTSCHRIFT 30 JAHRE JURISTISCHE FAKULTAET DER
UNIVERSITAET AUGSBURG, at II 1 c (forthcoming, on file with the Chicago-Kent Law Review).
211. See supra at Part III.B.1-3; see also MUELLER, supra note 101, at 101.
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German law has had and still has difficulty openly accepting pu-
nitive damages as part of its legal system and explaining how non-
compensatory damages can fit into a system presumably restricting
the law of damages to compensation. As far as damages for pain and
suffering are concerned, courts and legal writers still try to explain the
aforementioned deviations from a plain compensatory system by
inventing the idea of "satisfaction." '212 But this explanation is no
longer persuasive in cases in which courts rely on deterrence as the
German Federal Court of Justice did in the Caroline of Monaco
cases.213 Deterrence being among the predominant purposes of
punitive damages, the noncompensatory approach of German courts
must be classified as punitive.
In intellectual property infringement cases, German law main-
tains the guise that damage calculations are strictly compensatory.
But in reality, damage awards are not proportional to the actual
losses incurred. In fact, damages can be awarded without there being
any real losses at all. This approach is no longer in accord with
traditional notions of compensatory damages that are victim-oriented
and loss-oriented. Instead, when damages are calculated by doubling
the amount of the estimated loss of a licensing fee, the courts are
using a tortfeasor-based approach. This approach is openly justified
as necessary to create a substantial deterrent effect beyond the
insubstantial deterrence of mere compensatory damage awards.
Thus, although damages in intellectual property infringement cases
are often classified as traditional compensatory damages, they are in
fact at least partially punitive.
Similarly, in employment discrimination cases, there is a re-
quirement that the damages awarded have a deterrent effect. Even
though these are also labeled as compensatory damages, it is clear
that they serve an expressly punitive function. Thus, it is apparent
that under modern German law, damages are awarded that are by
their nature at least partially punitive.
D. Have Punitive Damages Changed from an Exception to a Second
Pillar of the German System of Damages?
Because punitive damage awards have increased in both fre-
quency and importance, it is no longer clear whether such awards are
212. See supra Part III.B.1.
213. See sources cited at supra note 157.
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merely tolerated exceptions to a monistic system, or whether they
have become an integral part of a dualistic system of damages. To
answer this, we first must realize that punitive damage awards have
been applied to such broad areas that they can hardly be considered
exceptional. Punitive damages are awarded for pain and suffering in
cases involving infringement of the right of personality by the me-
dia.214 Intellectual property and unfair trade practices cases are
frequently governed by the notion of deterrence, which results in
damages that are not purely compensatory. 21 Further, cases that
involve employment discrimination based on gender are governed by
punitive damages ideas,216 along with other types of discrimination.
Such broad application of punitive damages suggests that they are no
longer an exception, but instead represent a new system of damages.
Although the growth of punitive damages has arisen out of
varied factual situations, it is indicative of a systematic attempt to
enforce the underlying principle that illegal conduct must not pay.
For instance, in some intellectual property infringement actions,
damages are doubled in order to prevent the infringer from profiting
in the long run. Although compensation for the reasonable cost of a
license would restore the victim's actual losses, a repeated infringer
may stand to profit where enforcement is uncertain. Similarly, in
cases of infringement of the right to personality by the media and
employment discrimination cases, pure compensation does not
adequately skim off profits from illegal conduct.
If a system of damages were to rely solely on compensation,
there are situations where it would be rendered ineffective. If dam-
ages from illegal conduct are confined to the victim's losses, the
inherent deterrent effect of compensatory damages may be sufficient.
However, when illegal conduct gives rise to profits that are greater
than the damages incurred by the victim, or when there is a possibility
that the illegal conduct will not be caught, a purely compensatory
system of damages will fail to provide adequate deterrence. Al-
though there may be occasion to recover these additional profits
under an unjust enrichment theory, there is enough uncertainty in
such a system that deterrence is inadequate.
The increasing reliance of German law on damages with non-
compensatory and punitive elements sacrifices dogmatic purity in
214. See sources cited at supra note157; see also supra Part III.A.
215. See supra Part III.B.2.
216. See supra Part III.B.3.
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favor of natural justice. Although the punitive damages pillar does
not yet equal the traditional compensatory pillar, at least German law
has recognized the need to construct one.
IV. THE GAP BETWEEN AMERICAN AND GERMAN PUNITIVE
DAMAGES Is NARROWING
There are still significant differences between the American and
German systems of damages, the most important being the funda-
mental, theoretical attitudes each system holds toward punitive
damages. Despite recent developments in American law tending
toward restricting punitive damage awards,217 there is still little doubt
that punitive damages are an equal pillar within the American system
of damages. The German system, however, despite significant expan-
sion of the applicability of punitive damages,21 8 still strictly denies that
punitive damages form an integral part of the law of damages.
Whereas the American system maintains a dualistic approach with
both a victim compensation pillar and a tortfeasor punishment pillar,
the German system still pretends to be a monistic system built on a
single pillar of victim compensation. Punishment and deterrence are
not yet acknowledged as legitimate general functions of damages in
the German system, but instead are tolerated exceptions. A further
difference is that the amounts awarded for punitive damages in
American courts are oftentimes greater than would be permissible
under German law-even under the recent rulings of the German
Federal Supreme Court.219
Despite apparent differences between German and American
blackletter doctrine, recent developments suggest that the gap is
narrowing for practical purposes. As far as the conceptual differences
are concerned, it must not be neglected that punitive damages more
than occasionally serve additional compensatory functions. This is
not a new development. Compensatory functions of punitive dam-
ages exist and have been accepted for some time.220 And this does not
alter the character of punitive damages. Punitive damages do not
217. See supra Part II.
218. See supra Part III.
219. See supra Part II.A.1; see also notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
220. What is changing seems to be that in foreign countries, and notably in Germany, courts
either start to be more aware of these additional functions, or, more likely, start to be more
willing to realize and focus upon these functions in order to establish sufficient similarities
between the systems, allowing them to gradually pass from their former rigid verdict on punitive
damages towards a more differentiated and, at least in part, favorable attitude.
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become compensatory when they serve additional compensatory
functions. However, these additional compensatory functions in
practice may narrow the gap between the systems. Moreover, the
American system is undergoing some significant changes, making it
more akin to the German system.2 21 For instance, a number of
American states have made punitive damages permissible only where
authorized by statute.222 Although these restrictions still allow for
broader applicability of punitive damages in America than in Ger-
many, it is noteworthy that both systems accept the theoretical need
for some level of restrictions on punitive damages.
There are also changes occurring in the German system that tend
to narrow the gap.223 The German courts are not only relying more
often on punitive arguments, they are even openly awarding damages
that are punitive in nature in certain types of cases. Considered
together, these developments constitute a significant step toward the
implementation of punitive damage awards in Germany. The debate
over whether tort law should concern conduct or the consequences of
conduct may have cleared the way for further reliance on punitive
considerations.224 The progress toward building a punitive damages
pillar in parallel to the traditional purely compensatory damages
pillar has not likely reached its peak. While many of the most spec-
tacular alterations have already taken place, the developments of the
last several years are not likely to abate. Now that the German courts
have accepted punitive arguments in cases of infringement of the
right to personality by the media, it should be expected that the
courts will also be receptive in other cases to the underlying principle
that punitive damages are necessary, not only to compensate for
damages, but also to remove the profit motive from the willful
infringement of individual rights.
The gap is also narrowing in regard to the amount of damages
that can be awarded. Although a cursory analysis may suggest that
221. See supra Part II.
222. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-220(2) (2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.16 (1997);
S.D. Codified Laws § 21-1-4 (Michie 1987); Int'l Harvester Credit Corp. v. Seale, 518 So. 2d
1039, 1041 (La. 1988); USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 467 N.E.2d 1271, 1284 (Mass.
1984); Barr v. Interbay Citizens Bank of Tampa, Fla., 635 P.2d 441,443 (Wash. 1981).
223. See supra Part IILA-C.
224. There is a perennial debate among German jurists regarding whether an act is
necessarily illegal because of the presence of damages caused by the act, or whether an act can
be illegal by itself, without reference to the damages caused. See STEFAN GRUNDMANN,
MUENCHENER KOMMENTAR BUERGERLICHES GESETZBUCH, SCHULDRECHT ALLGEMEINER
TEIL, § 276 at n.12 (4th ed. 2001).
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the amount of damages awarded is not as important as the conceptual
differences between the American and German systems, in fact, the
amount of damage awards is a practical measure of whether damages
are being used to serve a punitive function, and huge awards may
make a punitive damages system even more suspicious to a presuma-
bly purely compensatory system. By definition, compensatory
damages are limited by the actual losses of the victim. Thus, in
theory, for the same fact pattern, the compensatory damages should
be the same whether they are awarded in a German or an American
court. Punitive damages, however, are subject to the discretion of the
court in America, leaving a potential for the gap between these
systems to widen if the amount of punitive damages is systematically
increased. When American punitive damage awards reach staggering
levels, they tend to arouse suspicion from the German perspective on
the entire American system of punitive damages.25 In recent years,
however, the permissible amounts of punitive damage awards have
been limited in a significant number of American states by either
imposing absolute ceilings or by linking punitive damages to actual
damages. These restrictions do not negate the punitive function of
such damages, but instead help to rationalize the system through
foreseeability of liability based on economically calculable factors. At
the same time capping the amount of punitive damage awards and
linking them to the amounts of actual damages sustained reduces the
amount of damages awarded and in a sense makes them more compa-
rable to German developments.
These American limitations parallel developments in the Ger-
man damages system and indicate that the gap between the systems is
narrowing. As the American system has reduced the amounts
available for damages that are expressly punitive, the German system
has increased damages by recognizing punitive arguments. And
linking the amount of punitive damages to the amount of actual
damages is not just of old lineage dating back to Roman law, but at
least in the field of intellectual property226 protection, it has survived
the many changes the German Civil Code has undergone.
225. See also Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc, 492 U.S. 257, 282 (1989)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[tihe threat of such enormous [punitive] damage awards has a
detrimental effect...").
226. See supra Part III.B.2.
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V. THE NARROWING GAP MAY AFFECT THE ENFORCEMENT OF
AMERICAN PUNITIVE DAMAGES JUDGMENTS IN GERMANY
The narrowing gap between American and German punitive
damages systems may affect both the enforcement of American
punitive damage awards in Germany, as well as how German courts
apply American law as required by private international law. Ameri-
can commentators have written extensively on the recognition and
enforcement of American judgments outside America 227 and more
specifically on the enforcement of American punitive damages in
Germany.228 Recent developments in the German Federal Supreme
Court have fueled this discussion.229 This Article, however, will be
confined to discussion of the likely effect of the narrowing gap on the
enforcement of damage awards in German courts.
A hypothetical will show the difficult issues faced by German
courts in maintaining consistency in enforcement of American
punitive damage judgments. Consider, for instance, that cases arose
nearly simultaneously under which the German courts had on the one
hand to decide on the case and on the other hand to enforce Ameri-
can judgments. In this example, posit that one case is a gender
discrimination suit against an employer, another case is a copyright
infringement case, and again another case is a case of the Caroline I
type. Under the German system, the cases would be assigned to
separate courts, with the discrimination case heard by the German
Federal Labor Court, and the copyright case heard by the German
Federal Supreme Court. This, however, opens up the possibility of
inconsistent treatment between the courts. In the domestic case the
panel would award what obviously is punitive damages. In the recog-
nition case these courts must consider whether to follow precedents
on recognition and declare the American judgments as being against
stated German public policy or to follow the precedent set by other
German courts and allow the punitive damages to stand. The similar-
227. See ALAN DASHWOOD ET AL., A GUIDE TO THE CIVIL JURISDICTION AND
JUDGMENTS CONVENTION (1987); ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
AND UNITED STATES JUDGMENTS ABROAD (Ronald A. Brand, ed., 1992); PETER KAYE, CIVIL
JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS (1987).
228. See Friedrich K. Juenger, The Recognition of Money Judgments in Civil and Commer-
cial Matters, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1988); Dieter Martiny, Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Money Judgments in the Federal Republic of Germany, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 721 (1987);
Zekoll, supra note 91
229. See Behr, supra note 9; Brand, supra note 12, at 163-165; Hartwin Bungert, Enforcing
U.S. Excessive and Punitive Damages Awards in Germany, 27 INT'L LAW 1075 (1993); Hay,
supra note 7; Zekoll, supra note 91.
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ity between the American judgment and parallel German judgments
would make the argument for enforcement compelling.
A. Public Policy Restrictions as a Safety Valve on the Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments and the Application of Foreign Law
To avoid forcing their own national courts to administer the law
in a way that is considered to be contrary to public policy,2 30 almost
every legal system relies on some self-protection mechanism to
prevent application of foreign laws or enforcement of foreign judg-
ments that exceed the outer limits of its own legal system. Such
restrictions are often seen as necessary to preserve national sover-
eignty against encroachment by foreign legislation. Many legisla-
tures 231 have enacted a "safety valve"2 32 that prevents the application
of foreign law or the enforcement of foreign judgments2 33 where the
outcome would be contrary to domestic public policy. This type of
legislation has occasionally been criticized as outdated and as an
anachronism. 234 Nevertheless, such restrictions have been incorpo-
rated into modern international conventions for the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments,235 including recent European
230. As to unbearable results as a basis for public policy rejection of enforcement, see Jens
Drolshamner & Heinz Schaerer, Die Verletzung des materiellen ordre public als
Verweigerungsgrund bei der Vollstreckung eines US-amerikanischen punitive damages-Urteils,
1986 SCHWEIZERISCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 309, 312 (relying on Swiss Federal Court decisions).
231. As to member states of the European Union, see Behr, supra note 9, at 221; Alexander
Bruns, Der anerkennungsrechtliche ordre public in Europa und den USA, 6 JURISTEN-ZEITUNG
278, 280-87 (1999).
232. Karen E. Minehan, The Public Policy Exception to the Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments: Necessary or Nemesis?, 18 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 795, 796 (1996).
233. American courts generally decline to execute foreign judgments that contravene
domestic public policy. See Hilton v. Guyot, 59 U. S. 113, 164-65 (1895) (discussing the "comity
of nations," a doctrine that established the public policy requirements of enforcing foreign
judgments); see also Somportex, Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440-43 (3d
Cir. 1971) (recent court decision relying on the comity doctrine).
234. Commission communication to the Council and the European Parliament 'towards
greater efficiency in obtaining and enforcing judgments in the European Union', art. 20, 21,
1998 O.J. (C 33) 3, 9-10 (proposing to dispense with the public policy requirement between
member-states). But see Bruns, supra note 231, at 284-87.
235. European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, 72/454, art. 27, 1972 J.O. (L 299) 32, 37, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 229,
236 (1969) [hereinafter Brussels Convention]; Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 88/592, art. 27, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, 13, reprinted
in 28 I.L.M. 620, 629 (1989) [hereinafter Lugano Convention]. As to the "very restricted" public
policy requirement under Article 27 of the 1968 Brussels Convention, see 2 ARTHUR BUELOW
ET AL., DER INTERNATIONALE RECHTSVERKEHR IN ZIVIL- UND HANDELSSACHEN Art. 27, 28
nn. 5-7 (2000).
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Community regulations on jurisdiction and enforcement.23 6 Further,
these types of public policy restrictions are likely to be included in the
forthcoming Hague Jurisdiction and Enforcement Convention. 237
B. Public Policy Requirements under German Law
The analysis of whether a foreign judgment is contrary to Ger-
man public policy requires consideration of several factors. First,
foreign judgments are presumed to be enforceable and foreign law is
presumed to be applicable. Public policy objections are invoked only
in those exceptional cases where the gap between foreign law and
German law is considered to be unbearable. 23 8  This gap must
threaten fundamental and indispensable principles of German law,
such that recognition of the foreign system would create a result
prohibited under German law.239 Second, public policy objections are
based on the result of recognition of a foreign judgment, not on the
theoretical foundations of the foreign system or the mere fact that
there is a divergence between the two systems. Third, the notion of
what is contrary to public policy is a fluid concept that is subject to
change as the underlying principles of the German system change.
Obviously, if German law develops principles that are similar to those
in a foreign system, the application of foreign law can no longer be
declared contrary to public policy. Fourth, and finally, public policy
restrictions are invoked only where domestic interests are at stake.
Thus, there must be a German interest in preventing the foreign
judgment from being recognized.24°
Modern German statutory regulations make clear that public
policy objections are meant to have limited reach.241 The former
236. Council Regulation 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition
and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, art. 34, 2001 O.J. (L 12) 1, 10;
Council Regulation 1347/2000 of 29 May 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforce-
ment of judgments in matrimonial matters and in matters of parental responsibility for children
of both spouses, art. 15, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 19, 24.
237. Minehan, supra note 232, at 795
238. Behr, supra note 9, at 224. As to the extremely restricted use of the public policy
exception in the U.S., see Minehan, supra note 232, at 799-808. As to a similar restricted
practice within the European Union, see id. at 808-15; see also Bruns, supra note 231, at 279-
87.
239. SCHACK, supra note 11, at n.867.
240. BGHZ 118, 312 (348); SCHACK, supra note 11, at n.867; Drolshammer & Schaerer,
supra note 230, at 312.
241. SCHACK, supra note 11, at n.861.
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article 30 of the Introductory Code 242 declared foreign law inapplica-
ble where its application was contrary to the morals or the purposes
of German law. However, the modern article 6 of the Introductory
Code establishes more stringently that foreign law is inapplicable only
where it leads to results that are manifestly irreconcilable with
fundamental principles of German law or with the basic rights
granted in the German constitution.2 43 As such, article 6 codifies prior
judicial interpretation of article 30 that limited restrictions on applica-
tion of foreign law to cases where "irremovable fundaments of
German public and social life" would be violated. 244  A recent
amendment to German private international law of torts245 restricts
the application of foreign law only where such law reaches signifi-
cantly beyond what is necessary to adequately compensate the
injured person or to the extent that they pursue goals other than
adequately compensating the victim. 246  In line with these develop-
ments in private international law, section 328(4) of the German
Code of Civil Procedure has been altered to require that public policy
arguments be invoked only where the recognition of a foreign judg-
ment would be "manifestly contrary" to "fundamental principles" of
German law. 247 This restriction again should be evaluated in the light
of new Article 40 of the Introductory Code specifically addressing the
role of public policy in tort law.248
242. Art. 30 of the Introductory Code to the German Civil Code [EGBGB] [Introductory
Code], v. 8.8.1896 (RGB1. S.195).
243. The Introductory Code was significantly changed by Gesetz zur Neuregelung des
Internationalen Privatrechts (Private International Law Act), v. 25.7.1986 (BGBl. I S.1142).
Subsequently, Article 30 of the Introductory Code was modified and renumbered as Article 6 of
the Introductory Code.
244. BGHZ 42, 7 (13).
245. The most recent amendment to the Introductory Code has, among other things,
introduced new regulations on the law pertaining to extracontractual relations. Among those
regulations, Articles 40 to 42 of the Introductory Code address the private international law of
torts.
246. Article 3, subsections (1) and (2) of the Introductory Code states: Claims falling under
the law of a foreign state cannot be made as far as they (1) substantially reach beyond what is
necessary to the adequate compensation of the damaged (2) evidently serve to purposes other
than adequate compensation of the damaged (author's translation).
247. As to new European regulations restricting the public policy exception to cases where
recognition and enforcement is manifestly contrary to public policy, see sources cited supra note
235,236.
248. Art. 40 of the Introductory Code, introduced by Gesetz zum Internationlen Privatrecht
fuer ausservertagliche Schuldverhaeltnisse und fuer Sachen (Act on Private International Law
of Non-Contractual Obligations), v. 21.5.1999 ( BGBI. I S.1026).
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C. German Public Policy Versus U.S. Punitive Damages
Based on these presumptions, especially with regard to the de-
pendence of public policy requirements on developments within
domestic law, it is necessary to reconsider the German attitude
toward enforcement of foreign punitive damages awards. Punitive
damages have been considered contrary to German public policy for
more than a century. 49 The Introductory Law to the German Civil
Code210 introduced the public policy requirement by citing "unrea-
sonably high and punitive damages" as examples of what would be
considered to be contrary to new German civil law and, thus, not be
awarded by a German court, even when applying foreign law.2 1 It
should be noted, however, that, at that stage, a distinction was already
made between punitive damages and excessive damages awards.25 2
Similarly, sections 723 and 328 of the German Code of Civil Proce-
dure, which prohibit execution of foreign judgments based on public
policy, have consistently been understood to exclude the execution of
punitive damage awards. 253
Rather than being the subject of extensive discussion in legisla-
tion and legal literature, enforcement of U.S. punitive damages
judgments was of no great practical relevance for a long time. Until
the famous 1992 Federal Supreme Court Judgment,254 there were
some published judgments on related problems, such as whether
249. See BGHZ 118, 338 (relying on the argument that the legislative procedure at the end
of the nineteenth century stated that the only adequate compensation was a theoretically sound
and substantially fair reaction to torts).
250. Art. 30 of the Introductory Code (later replaced by Art. 6 of the Introductory Code).
But there is a special public policy requirement in tort law, which was stated in former Article
38, which has been revised and renumbered as Article 40, subsection (3) of the Introductory
Code.
251. DIE BERATUNG DES BUERGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHS, EINFUEHRUNGSGESETZ ZUM
BUERGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH UND NEBENGESETZE 350 (Horst Heinrich Jakobs & Werner
Schubert eds. 1990) (noting that the legislative history of the Introductory Code indicates that a
provision for the unenforceability of private fines was omitted because such a provision was
deemed to be included in the public policy requirement).
252. This is what the new Article 40, subsection (3) of the Introductory Code, dealing with
applicable law in torts, now expressly addresses. In its two alternatives, claims in tort under
foreign law are not available: first, where such claims reach significantly beyond what is
necessary to adequately compensate the victim, and, second, where such claims manifestly
pursue goals other than adequate compensation. Hence, only claims of excessiveness or
manifest deviation from compensation are inadmissible.
253. See ADOLF BAUMBACH/WOLFGANG LAUTERBACHIJAN ALBERS/PETER HARTMANN,
ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG, 54 ed. 1996, § 328 Nr. 44 ZPO.
254. See generally BGHZ 118, 312. For extensive discussion of this judgment, see Brand,
supra note 12, at 163-66; Bungert, supra note 229, at 1076-77; Hay, supra note 7, at 729-50; and
Zekoll, supra note 91, at 644-59.
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service of process of U.S. punitive damage claims could be denied for
public policy reasons215 and whether enforcement of a U.S. judgment
awarding damages for pain and suffering over and above comparable
German judgments could be denied for public policy reasons. 6
Meanwhile, increasing internationalization of personal and economic
activities as well as internalization of lawyers' activities has rendered
enforcement of foreign money judgments increasingly common-
place.2 17 Consequently, enforcement of U.S. punitive damages awards
abroad is more likely to become a problem of practical relevance,
although it should be noted that practical experiences in this area are
still relatively limited.
Those few cases related to enforcement of U.S. punitive damages
awards incidentally express the prevailing German attitude towards
U.S. punitive damages awards as it is expressed in traditional legal
literature.25 8 As a general rule, punitive damages awards are unen-
forceable because they are deemed a violation of German public
policy. 259 This basic rule is so widely established and accepted that
plaintiffs' attorneys no longer try to seek enforcement of such
awards. 60 Arguments opposing enforcement rely on different ap-
proaches. The Berlin judgment 261 provides little guidance in this
matter because the court in that case focused its discussion on other
issues, namely the fact that the U.S. judgment contained insufficient
grounds for enforcement and that any resulting uncertainty had to be
255. Oberlandesgericht [OLGZ] [Court of Appeals] (Munich) Judgment of May 9, 1989,
PRAXIS DES INTERNATIONALEN PRIVAT- UND VERFAHRENSRECHTS [IPRAX], May/June 1990,
at 175 (violation of public policy denied in case of claim for punitive damages under the Hague
Service Convention). For a similar decisions, see OLGZ (Munich) Judgment of July 15, 1992,
17 ZEITSCHRIFr FUER WIRTScHAFSRECHT [ZIP], 1270, 1271 (1992); OLGZ (Frankfurt)
Judgment of March 21, 1991, 5 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT [RIW] 417 (1991)
(violation of public policy denied in case of service of process, where it was expected that the
claim would be extended to include punitive damages); OLGZ (Duesseldorf) Judgment of
February 19, 1992, 10 RIW 846 (1992) (violation of public policy denied in case of service of
process, where excessive damages were claimed).
256. Landgericht [LG] [District Court] (Berlin) Judgment of June 13, 1989, 12 RIW 988
(1988), translated in [1992] I.L.PR. 430, 1992 WL 894031 (LG (Berlin)).
257. See Zekoll, supra note 91, at 641.
258. LG (Berlin) Judgment of June 16, 1989, 1989 DER BETRIEB 2100 (1989); OLGZ
(Duesseldorf) Judgment of May 28, 1991, 7 RIW 594 (1991); see generally BGHZ 118, 312 (334-
51).
259. BGHZ 118, 312 (338-51).
260. See BGHZ 141, 286 (287-88). The plaintiff, a Wisconsin based corporation, success-
fully sued the defendant in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The
court awarded $2,280,057.30 in damages plus costs. Of that award, $1 million was for punitive
damages. The plaintiff then sued to enforce the Wisconsin judgment in Germany, but failed to
sue for enforcement of the punitive damages portion of the award.
261. See sources cited supra note 256.
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to the detriment of the plaintiff to be actionable. In another case, the
Duesseldorf Court of Appeals262 focused on the "exorbitant" amount
of punitive damages awarded by the California court as well as on the
constitutional law principle of double jeopardy prohibition. More-
over, the Duesseldorf court held that because the California criminal
court had already punished the defendant, there was no need to
impose additional punishment, nor was there any deterrent value to
be gained. Finally, the Federal Supreme Court reviewing the Ober-
landesgericht Duesseldorf decision in its famous 1992 decision 263 for
the first time had the opportunity to decide on enforcement of U.S.
punitive damages awards. This decision has become the leading case
on enforcement of U.S. punitive damages awards. It has been
broadly discussed and deeply analyzed in numerous articles and
notes.264 Thus, a discussion pertaining to enforcement of U.S. dam-
ages awards must begin with an analysis of this decision.
In its 1992 landmark decision addressing most of the relevant
problems in enforcement cases,265 the Federal Supreme Court denied
enforcement of a California judgment for public policy reasons,
relying on principle as well as on the excessiveness of the amount of
damages awarded. The Court first came to the conclusion that
punitive damages awards are not penal sanctions in the strict sense.266
Relying on American and European literature on punitive damages,
the Court discussed the manner in which punitive damages are
administered in American courts as well as the goals served by
punitive damages. 267 The Court concluded that, from both an Ameri-
can and German perspective, despite their retributive and deterrent
functions, punitive damages are a function of civil law rather than
criminal law, at least where the award is granted to the plaintiff.268 As
262. See sources cited supra note 255.
263. BGHZ 118,312.
264. In German legal literature, this decision has incited no less than nineteen notes and
articles to date. See also BVerfGE 91, 140 (141-46) (holding that service of U.S. punitive
damages claims did not violate German constitutional law; however, the decision failed to
resolve the question as to the effect of punitive damages awards on the state's monopoly on
criminal law); OLGZ (Duesseldorf) Judgment of July 3, 1997, 6 U 67/96 (unpublished opinion)
(declaring that disproportionality of damages is not to be considered under public policy).
265. For an in-depth discussion of the different facets of this landmark case, see Hay, supra
note 7, at 729-50; Zekoll, supra note 91, at 641-59.
266. BGHZ 118, 312 (336-51). As to nonenforcement of penal judgments under U.S. law,
see The Republic of the Philippines v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 821 F. Supp. 292, 295-301
(D.N.J. 1993). For a similar approach under Japanese law, see Brand, supra note 12, at 167-68.
267. BGHZ 118, 312 (334-36).
268. Id. at 336-38.
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to the crucial question of whether punitive damages are contrary to
German public policy, the court stated, "an American punitive
damages judgment of not insignificant amount globally awarded
along with damages for material and immaterial losses in so far
generally cannot be declared enforceable in Germany. ' 269 The court
argued that (1) modern German civil law has restricted damages to
include only those that compensate the plaintiff and, consequently,
has abolished damages that lead to eventual enrichment of the victim
and punishment of the defendant; 270 (2) German law makes a clear-
cut distinction between the law of damages and public prosecution in
criminal law, the latter being exclusively lodged in the state's monop-
oly of criminal prosecution and thus safeguarded by special proce-
dural guarantees; 2 71 and (3) comparison of American punitive
damages and German damages for pain and suffering does not alter
the result because German damages for pain and suffering, despite
their function of giving satisfaction to the victim, have no immediate
penal character and are inseparably connected with the compensatory
function of damages. 272
Beyond the undisputable fact that this decision seems to be fully
in line with traditional rejection of enforcement of punitive damages
awards, there are several indications of the emergence of a more
favorable attitude in the future. First, we should realize that the
German Federal Supreme Court did not categorically reject enforce-
ment of punitive damages, but only rejected it "in general," leaving
open the possibility of enforcement under special circumstances.
Second, although its argument focused primarily on punitive damages
in and of themselves, the Court in its decisive ruling combined
punitive damages with a kind of excessiveness verdict, ruling that
"punitive damages of not insignificant amount" could not be en-
forced. Third, the Court in its ruling against enforcement of punitive
damages combined punitive damages with damages for material and
immaterial losses -the latter being enforced despite being far beyond
German standards-because the Court relied on the idea that only
significant deviations from German standards are relevant, a principle
that was eventually codified in the new article 40 of the Introductory
Code. Finally, although not directly related to punitive damages, it
269. Id. at 312-34 (author's translation).
270. Id. at 338.
271. Id. at 339-51.
272. Id.
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should be noted that the Court allowed enforcement of damages for
pain and suffering far beyond what, at that time, was acceptable in
German courts under similar circumstances. These cautious restric-
tions on the verdict may be partially explained by the notion that
punitive damages awards may be enforced only to the extent that
they constitute damages for pain and suffering, which, under German
law, are considered to be compensatory,273 or insofar as they are
meant to cover attorneys' fees.174 But this does not explain why the
Court relied on "punitive damages judgment of not insignificant an
amount," the amount of punitive damages being irrelevant to their
noncompensatory nature.
What seems even more questionable and what may eventually
lead to a more favorable attitude toward enforcement of foreign
punitive damages can be derived from the Court's efforts to distin-
guish enforceable damages for pain and suffering from generally
unenforceable punitive damages. The court argued that the functions
of punishment and deterrence in punitive damages cannot be com-
pared to the function of satisfaction in damages for pain and suffer-
ing, the latter having no immediate penal effect and being inseparably
connected with the compensatory function of damages.275 It is highly
questionable whether the somehow artificial and dogmatic distinction
between direct and indirect penal functions is sufficient to declare a
legal instrument against public policy simply because of its direct
penal functions. What is more important is that the Federal Supreme
Court relied on a stereotypical description of the German law of
damages, which no longer reflects modern reality. The Court could
not at the time of its decision anticipate that shortly thereafter
another panel of the Court would, in its Caroline I decision, 276 adopt
an approach openly accepting direct penal functions of damages. In
future enforcement decisions, the Court will have to take into consid-
eration this development as well as developments in other areas of
the German law of damages. Further, the Court could not foresee the
strong pressure from the European Court of Justice in the field of
273. Regarding the enforceability of punitive damages when awarded in conjunction with
damages for pain and suffering, see BGHZ 118, 312 (340). As to the importance of recognizing
punitive damages to the extent that they serve compensatory purposes, especially where
punitive damages are combined with high awards for pain and suffering, see Hay, supra note 7,
at 746-50.
274. BGHZ 118, 312 (339-51).
275. Id. at 339.
276. BGHZ 128, 1. This is a case of infringement of the right to personality.
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damages for discrimination in employment, nor could it foresee that
community legislation would broaden this concept. But the Court
will have to take these developments into consideration in future
decisions on enforcement. At the moment, any prediction as to
where the developments will lead would be pure speculation. But,
eventually, modern developments in German courts towards award-
ing what in substance are punitive damages in line with restrictions on
excessiveness of U.S. awards could result in a compromise, which
could enable German courts to openly enforce punitive damages
awards as long as amounts are not excessive.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the nineteenth century, the controversy as to
whether the law of damages should be monistic and purely compensa-
tory or it should be dualistic, allowing both compensatory and puni-
tive damages, was handled in similar ways in the United States and in
Germany. Only since the beginning of the twentieth century have the
respective laws developed in different directions. In the United
States, the dualistic system prevailed, whereas in Germany the
process of unification of the civil law established a purely monistic,
compensatory law of damages. From a German perspective this gap,
from the very beginning, seemed unbridgeable. German legislation,
jurisprudence, and legal literature deemed the monistic system of
damages as one of the fundamental principles of the German legal
system. This is best highlighted by the continuous classification of
punitive damages as contrary to German public policy, a classification
that can be traced back to the Preparatory Documents to the German
Civil Code and that still is evident in the recent German Federal
Court's decisions denying enforcement of U.S. punitive damages
awards. Up to now, this gap was considered to be fundamental and
unbridgeable. But during recent decades signs have emerged that the
gap appears to be narrowing. Although under American law, the
punitive damages pillar of the dualistic system is preserved, and, in a
sense, is even developing additional aspects insofar as part of the
punitive award is no longer going to the victim and exorbitant puni-
tive damage awards are still allowed, this pillar is starting to be
eroded by ceilings in a significant number of states. Moreover, the
punitive damages pillar has some inherent compensatory aspects. On
the other hand, the apparently monistic German system is starting to
insert punitive elements into its purely compensatory law of damages.
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At the same time, the amount of damage awards have increased
significantly. Whether the gap already has been sufficiently narrowed
to make it bridgeable under public policy considerations is question-
able, even taking into consideration that the German public policy
concept is undergoing significant changes. But narrowing the gap has
at least begun, and this development does not yet seem to have
reached its end.

